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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE USSR?

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SPECIAL 64-PAGE DOUBLE ISSUE

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CONTENTS

VOLUME EIGHT NUMBER THREE JULY 1956
and NUMBER FOUR AUGUST 1956

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: After the Twentieth Congress 65
CARTOON by Fred Wright 83
ON SOVIET THEMES by Paul A. Baran 84
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE JEWS by Joshua Kunitz 92
CRITIQUE OF THE STALIN ERA by Anna Louise Strong 100
PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SOCIALISM: Has the Communist Party a Future? by Alexander Leslie 106
INNOCENT PARTIES by Sagittarius 111
WHAT'S IN A NAME? by Henry Pratt Fairchild 113
THE GREAT ROAD—PRELUDE by Agnes Smedley 117
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 122

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Please note that this is a special 64-page double issue for both July and August. The newsstand price is 50 cents. The next issue will appear in September.

On several occasions in the past, we have published single issues of 64 pages. But summer is always the slack season in the magazine field; costs have gone up recently; and finances are low. This time, we had to choose between a double 64-page issue and two 32-pagers; and we decided, since most of the material bears on a set of related problems arising out of recent developments in the Soviet Union, that it would be more logical from everyone's point of view to bring it all together between two covers. We hope you will approve of the decision, and we remind you, as we have on numerous occasions in the past, that MR will never really be free to solve problems of this kind as they ought to be solved until we have a considerably larger circulation and much more adequate financial reserves to draw upon.

Here is an interesting footnote to Paul Sweezy's coast-to-coast speaking

(*continued on inside back cover*)

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AFTER THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS

What goes on in the Soviet Union?

This is a question which the whole world has been asking in recent months. The reason is simple: the future of mankind may well depend upon the answer.

We have encountered a number of theories, among which the following would seem to be the most important:

(1) Nothing has really changed. The downgrading of Stalin and other actions taken at and since the Twentieth Congress are in the nature of a public relations campaign—undertaken, like all such campaigns, to win friends and influence people. Basically, the *system* remains the same, and attitudes and policies toward it which were appropriate before are just as appropriate now. In this view, the crux of the matter is the one-party dictatorship. Unless or until this is modified—and no one, so far as we know, claims that it has been—the Soviet Union must continue to be just what it has been in all respects that really matter. This is probably the dominant theory in the West, adhered to alike by official Washington and by the Socialist International. (The clearest and most concise statement of this position which we have seen is in a letter to the *New Statesman and Nation* (May 12) by the German Social Democrat Richard Lowenthal, better known for his theoretical writings under the pen name of Paul Sering.)

(2) The Soviet Union is essentially a socialist democracy, but in Stalin's later years a cult of personality grew up which fostered an undue concentration of power in the hands of one man and resulted in serious deviations from true Leninist principles. The Twentieth Congress marks a "return to the source": here we see socialist democracy in practice, correcting its own errors and preparing the way for a great new advance. This is the official Communist theory, reflected in the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress itself as well as in the pronouncements of Communist Parties and spokesmen all over the world in the period since the Congress.[1]

1 The most comprehensive collection of documents on the Congress which has come to our attention is *XX^e Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique, 14-25 Février 1956,* a 484-page special supplement to the French

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(3) Soviet society and the Soviet position in the world have undergone sweeping changes since the first Five Year Plan was inaugurated in 1928. The country has been industrialized. A population, formerly made up to a large extent of illiterate peasants, has been to school and has learned the discipline of modern technology. Long isolated and twice invaded, the USSR is now surrounded by friends and allies, including the most populous country in the world. Finally, the achievement of atomic parity with the United States has produced a military stalemate which, by common agreement, greatly reduces the threat of a third world war. Under these circumstances, the Stalinist police state, which grew up on the foundations of the Tsarist police state in the beleaguered-fortress atmosphere of the '20s and '30s, began to lose its *raison d'etre* and soon became an obstacle to further economic and cultural progress. The Soviet leadership drew the necessary conclusions and began to implement them immediately after Stalin's death; the Twentieth Congress marks an acceleration of trends set in motion at that time. Among the various versions of this theory, probably the best-known is to be found in the writings of Isaac Deutscher, including his prophetic *Russia What Next?* written during the six weeks following Stalin's death. But the theory in one form or another is widely held in left-wing circles, and doubtless also by many thoughtful people of liberal or conservative bent.

Theories That Don't Explain

We have tried to weigh these theories carefully and have come to the conclusion that the first two just don't explain the facts we have before us.

The trouble with the first theory is that important things *have* changed. The downgrading of Stalin is itself an action of enormous importance, and it simply makes no sense to *explain* it as a public-relations maneuver. (This is not to deny, of course, that there is a sense in which almost any great policy change can be looked upon as a public-relations move. For example, if the United States were to call off the cold war, it would undoubtedly be a brilliant stroke of public relations. But would anyone be satisfied with this as an explanation for such a momentous policy change?) Moreover, the trend to liberalization in the Soviet world is undoubtedly real and has already produced far-reaching results. The labor camps have been made to symbolize the Stalinist police state—not without reason.

CP organ *Cahiers du Communisme,* published in March. Individual speeches and resolutions have, of course, already appeared in a variety of forms in English translation, and the entire proceedings will doubtless be made available between two covers in English.

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They are being closed. Eye-witness accounts, the reliability of which is not open to doubt, attest to the changed atmosphere in the socialist countries, and especially to the increased sense of personal security which the citizens now feel. For example, R. H. S. Crossman, a British Laborite who has been in the forefront of the anti-Communist movement for years, recently returned from a trip to Poland. In a letter to the *New Statesman* (May 12), he states flatly that

> miraculous changes, of which I saw a glimpse, are taking place in the Communist world. . . . Why on earth should Socialists refuse to believe their eyes? Why should they say stubbornly that they *know* that a Communist dictatorship cannot be modified in the direction of liberty, when all the evidence shows that this is just what is happening?

This points to the basic fallacy of theory number (1), that as long as the one-party regime remains intact no change of importance can occur. There are *many* other factors beside the number of parties which affect the policies and evolution of a regime. To shut one's eyes to everything else is to accept a voluntary form of blindness.

The second theory—that what has been happening in the USSR is a case of a socialist democracy correcting its errors—is no more satisfactory. The problem here is not one of semantics, of the meaning of the word "democracy." The appropriate place to discuss that is in an entirely different context. The real problem lies in the idea of "error" as a historical concept. Undoubtedly errors do happen and have a place in historical explanation. In wars, particularly, crucial decisions can often be traced to one or a few people, and if they go wrong they can only be described as errors which would not have been committed if their consequences had been correctly foreseen. But in making use of this kind of explanation, we must be sure that we can pinpoint the crucial decisions and identify those who were responsible for making them. And we must certainly *not* attempt to explain gradual and cumulative historical processes as the result of a long series of "errors" committed by many different people, for used in this way the notion of error loses any definite meaning and becomes a mere substitute for serious analysis.

There is no doubt in our minds that the "errors" which the Soviet Union is now said to be correcting are of the gradual and cumulative kind. Take the cult of personality which grew up around Stalin, for example. Was this something for which Stalin, or for that matter any identifiable group of individuals, was responsible? We do not believe that any serious student of Russian history would claim that it is. Quite apart from whether Stalin liked it or not—and there is plenty of evidence that at least in the earlier period he did *not*—it has to be stressed that the cult of Stalin was superimposed upon an

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already-existing cult of Lenin who most certainly hated it. What Deutscher writes about the cult of Lenin is therefore very much to the point:

> The elaborate ceremony [of Lenin's funeral] was altogether out of keeping with the outlook and style of Lenin, whose sobriety and dislike of pomp were almost proverbial. The ceremony was calculated to stir the mind of a primitive, semi-oriental people into a mood of exaltation for the new Leninist cult. So was the Mausoleum in the Red Square, in which Lenin's embalmed body was deposited, in spite of his widow's protest and the indignation of many Bolshevik intellectuals. To myriads of peasants, whose religious instincts were repressed under the revolution, the Mausoleum became a place of pilgrimage. . . . Just as original Christianity . . . absorbed elements of pagan beliefs and rites . . . so now Marxism . . . was absorbing elements of the Byzantine tradition. . . . The process was inevitable. The abstract tenets of Marxism could exist, in their purity, in the brains of intellectual revolutionaries. . . . Now, after the doctrine had really been transplanted to Russia and come to dominate the outlook of a great nation, it could not but, in its turn, assimilate itself to that nation's spiritual climate, to its traditions, customs, and habits. Imperceptibly, the process had been going on for some time. Nobody had had a deeper insight into it and felt more embarrassed by it than Lenin. (*Stalin: A Political Biography*, 1949, p. 269.)

Exactly the same process was to go on for a long time to come, and it makes little difference whether one regards Stalin as its victim or its beneficiary. In either case, it undoubtedly had its effect on him and helped to turn him into a murderous autocrat as the years went by. But to regard all this as an "error" of Stalin or anyone else is surely a travesty of serious historical analysis.

Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why the present Soviet leaders prefer to condemn the "cult of personality" as though it were simply Stalin's error. Their job is political leadership; and, like all politicians, they are more willing to confess other people's sins than their own. An attempt to explain the cult of personality as the outcome of Russian history and Soviet backwardness might not get across at all, and to absolve Stalin of personal responsibility would be to implicate the entire Soviet leadership during the period of Stalin's rule. Moreover, this argument would imply a condemnation of *all* cults of personality and an intention to extirpate them from Soviet and Communist ideology, and there is no sign that such a drastic break with the past is contemplated, let alone under way, at the present time. True, the cult of Stalin is being systematically destroyed; but, paradoxical as it may seem, the cult of Lenin is being built up at the very same time, as though to fill part of the vacuum. The

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record of the Twentieth Congress is full of encomiums to the "great" and "immortal" Lenin; and while they undoubtedly have much in common with the homage which all peoples pay to their Founding Fathers, they also bear eloquent witness to the continued vigor with which at least one cult of personality is being inculcated into the minds of the Soviet people. It will probably be a long time yet before all such irrational survivals of the past will be relegated to the trash heap of history.

Communist Parties in other countries, and especially in the West, have an obligation, which they have so far signally failed to discharge, to explain these matters to their own members. We shall return to the problem of non-Soviet Communist Parties below: here we only note that all except the Chinese Party seem to have accepted the official Soviet "error" theory with their customary uncritical enthusiasm. The Chinese Party uses the same language but (to judge from the long editorial from the Peking *People's Daily* which is published in the May issue of *Political Affairs*) it gives to this language a much more sophisticated content. On the cult of personality, for example, it would be hard to improve on the following: "The cult of the individual is . . . a force of habit of millions and tens of millions. Since this force of habit still exists in society, it can influence many government functionaries, and even such a leader as Stalin was no exception. The cult of the individual is a reflection in the minds of people of a social phenomenon. . . ." Even the Chinese position, however, shows strong traces of the cult of Lenin.

To sum up then: theory number (2) is quite understandable as a political statement and apologia of the Soviet leadership, but it doesn't help much to explain "what goes on in the Soviet Union."

A Theory That Does Explain

This leaves our third theory, and on the whole we think it is a good one. Let us restate it in somewhat expanded form and then attempt to explore some of its implications.

During the 1920s, the Soviet Union was a backward peasant country with few friends and many powerful enemies. The leadership was divided three ways: there were those who looked to a world revolution for salvation (Trotsky), those who favored going slow and hoping for the best (Bukharin), and those who called for a tremendous effort to develop the country's own resources and strength to enable it to come through whatever tests might lie ahead (Stalin). After bitter political struggles which left their mark on everything that was to follow, the third group won out and pursued its chosen policy with ruthless determination. The country was industrialized at breakneck speed; a vast educational program was improvised and strained

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to the limit; discipline was literally forced upon a new and untrained working class. To these ends a huge bureaucracy was hastily built up, and the whole lumbering machine was kept in order and whipped on by a ubiquitous secret police. The gamble succeeded. The great testing came in World War II, and the Soviet Union survived. But the time of troubles was still not over. To the vast burdens of reconstruction were added those of a cold war in which the USSR, while no longer isolated, was now faced with the menace of unilateral atomic annihilation. Under these circumstances, the forced march under the discipline of the knout continued. Even the mastery of atomic weapons and the gaining of a giant ally in China brought no immediate release from strain and tension, for hard on these events came the Korean War with its ever-present threat to explode into World War III.

Such was the Stalinist state at the time of the death of Stalin himself. It embodied a gigantic contradiction: in its aims and achievement it can fairly be described as superhuman; in its methods and attitude toward the rights and dignity of the individual it was subhuman.[2] Or to put the matter in other terms: on the one hand, the Soviet Union had become the world's second industrial power, with an educated citizenry and surrounded by friends and allies; on the other hand, it was governed by the methods of an oriental despotism rather than of a modern civilized society. This contradiction was driven to the breaking point by three events of 1953—the death of Stalin, the end of the Korean War, and the Soviet achievement of the H-bomb. Something had to give, and something did give. There was apparently a short, sharp crisis which ended with the downfall of Beria. Thereafter, the new leadership, following the logic of the situation in which it found itself, rapidly set about mending the country's international fences and redressing the balance of its internal structure. The Twentieth Congress can be taken as an official proclamation to the Soviet people and the world at large that the USSR is on the way to regaining its equilibrium and, barring accidents, intends to continue along its present course for a long time to come.

2 If there was ever any doubt about this, it should be dispelled once and for all by the revelations contained in Khrushchev's famous secret speech to the Twentieth Congress. (*New York Times,* June 5, 1956. The text, which was released by the State Department, may not be complete, but it is probably authentic as far as it goes.) In some ways an even more telling incident, unmentioned by Khrushchev, was the liquidation in 1948 of leading Yiddish writers and artists. What can be said about this except that it was outright barbarism? There was never a claim that the leaders of Yiddish culture were attempting to overthrow the Soviet state, and if such a claim were made it would be too ridiculous to be taken seriously. Nor does the allegation that all this was the work of Beria put a better face on the affair. No regime can escape responsibility for the dirty work of its secret police.

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The essence of this theory is that "Stalinism" was an extremely dynamic and profoundly self-contradictory phenomenon. Growing up under one set of conditions, it completely altered those conditions and thereby made its own continuation impossible. The analogy with the Marxian theory of capitalism is striking but should not be pushed too far: Stalinism is not a social system but rather a socio-political superstructure which arose in a backward mixed society which had to choose between going forward to socialism or backward to capitalism. It was shaped by the decision to go forward and became the instrument of the advance to socialism. But socialism, as a higher form of society, is quite incompatible with Stalinist methods. At this stage, the requirements of further progress called not for a social revolution in the Marxian sense of a complete change in underlying property relations, but rather for bringing the socio-political superstructure up to reasonably civilized standards. Conceivably, this might have entailed a *political* revolution more or less comparable to certain bourgeois political revolutions of an earlier period, but fortunately it did not. The Soviet leadership was, to be sure, trained in Stalinist methods, but it also retained its basic Marxian ideas and perspectives (this, indeed, is one of the many internal contradictions of Stalinism), and when the time came when change could no longer be put off, the leadership showed itself capable of adapting to the new situation.

De-Stalinization and Liberalization

Stalinism, we have emphasized, was a self-contradictory phenomenon. It accomplished good ends by bad means.[3] The present problem of the Soviet leadership is to abolish or reform Stalin's methods without casting doubts on the importance of his achievements. Hence we should definitely not expect to see the de-Stalinization campaign carried to the point of an attempt to destroy Stalin's reputation as one of the greats of Soviet history. It seems likely that, as time goes by, Soviet publicists and historians will seek to create an image of Stalin not unlike that which the world already has of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The similarities, indeed, have often been noted by foreign writers, and the comparison, if not overdone,

3 We shall be told by bourgeois moralizers that this is impossible—the very same people who enthusiastically support a $40-billion arms program. We shall also probably be told by "Marxist" philosophers that any means that produce a good end are *ipso facto* good. This, in our view, is sheer sophistry and has nothing to do with the philosophical doctrine of the unity of means and ends. "Good" and "bad" are ethical terms, and Marxists can *no more get along without them than anyone else can. To be sure, there* are differences between bourgeois and Marxian ethics, but there are some things which sensible Marxists, along with all other decent people, regard as bad—and one of them is torturing and killing other human beings.

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undoubtedly contains an important element of historical truth.

How far, then, is the liberalization process now under way in the Soviet world likely to go? Our theory gives every reason for believing that the process is genuine and important, but it also contains an implicit warning against exaggerated hopes or expectations.

Stalinism incorporated the methods of oriental despotism—murder, mendacity, duplicity, brutality, and above all arbitrariness. This was no accident. These are the methods which are often found in a governing apparatus superimposed upon a backward, primitive society. And it was precisely these methods that were rendered intolerable by the industrialization and education of the Soviet people. Modern science and technology, as Veblen repeatedly emphasized, have a logic of their own: in particular, they inculcate a respect for facts, for order, for predictability and reliability. Not only would a people with these attitudes be repelled by Stalinist methods; perhaps even more important, their productivity would be increasingly impaired. On the latter point, Khrushchev was very explicit in his secret report to the Twentieth Congress:

> We should also not forget that due to the numerous arrests of party, Soviet, and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed over-cautiousness, feared all which was new, feared their own shadows, and began to show less initiative in their work.

In other words, the continuation of Stalinist methods was undoubtedly alienating the leadership from the people and opening up a widening gap between the actual and the potential performance of the Soviet economy. We may be sure that it was these problems, rather than abstract humanitarianism, which motivated the Soviet leaders to change their course in the last three years.

But if this is right, it suggests that at this stage of the game we would be wrong to expect more from de-Stalinization than the abolition or rectification of methods which were most obviously in conflict with the present needs and attitudes of the Soviet people. We may expect an end of arbitrary police rule, but certainly not an end of the secret police. We may expect an end to the frame-up, but not an end to the conception of political crime. We may expect an end to the deliberate falsification of history, but not an end to the party-line interpretation of history. The Stalin cult is dead, but not the Lenin cult. Above all, there is no ground for expecting an abandonment of the one-party state or any abdication of its monopoly of leadership by the Communist Party. Our theory suggests these conclusions, and it would be possible to back up every one of them by appropriate quotations from the record of the Twentieth Congress. Since we don't have the space for this here, however, we merely

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suggest to interested readers that they go through Khrushchev's opening speech with these issues in mind.

The Long-run Perspective

All this may sound disappointing to people who have been reading the news out of Moscow as indicating the beginning of a sweeping process of democratization. But the truth is that there have never been any solid grounds for such extravagant expectations. The Soviet dictatorship is cleaning house, not abolishing itself. But we hasten to add that from our point of view, to say this is in no way to belittle the importance of what is happening. We believe that present reforms, despite their limited scope, will indeed set in motion or accelerate certain trends in Soviet society which *in the long run* will make further and more basic changes necessary and inevitable. Here we can do no more than suggest the general nature of the processes at work.

The key to power in a modern society—an industrialized, urbanized society of mass education and communications—is control over the public mind. In a very real sense, what we call "public opinion" is supreme: anyone who would govern effectively must have public opinion on his side, and no challenge to an existing regime can hope for success unless it enjoys public support and confidence. This implies that democracy in the sense of government by the people ("popular sovereignty") can be genuine only to the extent that public opinion is free of manipulation or tutelage by a small minority, whether that minority be a ruling class in the Marxian sense or a self-perpetuating political elite in the manner of the Communist dictatorships. In other words, if we may be allowed to use a shorthand expression, *genuine democracy means that public opinion is in a real sense self-forming.*

Now a "normal" capitalist society is of course not democratic at all in this sense: public opinion is formed by the ruling class through its virtual monopoly control over the media of education and communication. Moreover, when everything is working smoothly, the institutions of bourgeois democracy (civil liberty and the party system) not only do not contradict this method of shaping public opinion to the needs of the ruling class; they actually facilitate it. But crisis is endemic to capitalism, and it inevitably becomes deeper and more continuous as the system matures.[4] As a consequence, it

4 This does *not* mean permanent economic depression. Capitalist crisis has many facets—economic, social, international—and to a certain extent they are *alternative* expressions of the underlying contradiction between the forces and relations of production. The hallmark of vulgar Marxism in our time—and its greatest weakness—is the assumption that the only possible (or significant) form of capitalist crisis is economic depression.

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becomes harder and harder for the ruling class to gain acceptance for the view that its interests are identical with the interests of the nation as a whole. The disparity between what the ruling class wants the masses to believe and what they are taught by their own experience becomes ever greater. Under these circumstances, the masses begin to think for themselves, to use the instruments of bourgeois democracy for self-education rather than allowing them to be used as mere conductors of the ideas of the ruling class. This is the spread of capitalist crisis into the political sphere: bourgeois democracy threatens to transform itself into genuine democracy, with necessarily disastrous results for viability and moral authority of the capitalist system. At this stage, the ruling class is ready to abandon the traditional institutions of bourgeois democracy and to seek new and more effective means of educating and controlling public opinion. Here we have the origin and explanation of the various systems of thought control that have grown up in the capitalist world in the last few decades: they are all attempts by the ruling class to master public opinion in situations where it threatens to become autonomous and to develop in a way that would be incompatible with the further functioning of capitalism.

Now, from our present point of view it is crucial to stress that this capitalist pattern does not fit Soviet development at all. The USSR started as a backward country in which public opinion was as yet too amorphous to play a decisive role. The function of the Stalinist state might be said to have been not to divert public opinion from its "natural" course (that *is* the purpose of the fascist state under capitalism), but rather to create public opinion and to press it into the service of socialist construction. In order to do this, Stalinism used much the same techniques as the capitalist thought-control systems, including physical coercion, deliberate falsification, hiding or glossing over of contradictions, and so on. But its purpose was diametrically opposite: not to preserve a system in perpetual and deepening crisis but to build a new system with limitless possibilities for expansion and progress. This was a thoroughly rational goal and to the extent that the Soviet thought-control system served it, the result was to produce an increasingly rational and enlightened public opinion. *At a certain point, this process of public opinion formation came into conflict with the methods that were being used to promote it.* Public opinion, having become a force in Soviet society, now began to play the decisive role which it must play in all societies which have become permeated with and irrevocably dependent upon modern science and technology.

At this point, the Soviet leadership faced a choice: either adapt to public opinion and modify the old methods, or try to make use of the old methods to curb the further growth and enlightenment of

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public opinion. The logic of the system as a whole dictated the former course: an attempt to pursue the latter would have led to increased tension and eventual crisis, with possibly disastrous results not only for the Soviet Union as a country but also for the leadership itself. Giving up the old methods, however, does not imply any changes in the forms of rule at this time. These have worked in the past and are still intact. But giving up the old methods does necessarily imply that the element of autonomy in the formation of public opinion will be increased. And this, in our view, is a cumulative process which will sooner or later result in the emancipation of public opinion from the tutelage of a self-chosen political elite. Then, but not until then, we shall see in the USSR a genuine socialist democracy, one in which a *rational and enlightend* public opinion is supreme and the political leadership is merely its chosen instrument.

This will certainly not come about without important institutional changes, but what their precise nature will be no one can now foretell. Many people in the West, including not a few left-wing socialists, take it for granted that the essential change will have to be a shift from a one-party to a multi-party system. This might, indeed, turn out to be the case, but we think it shows a certain lack of political imagination to assume that it must be so. Couldn't there also be, for example, an evolution toward a *no-party* system with novel forms of political representation and expression? What is crucial, after all, is not the number of parties but that people should have both the right and the habit of thinking freely and creatively, forming collective judgments, and imposing those collective judgments on those who administer their public affairs. In any case, whatever the final answers to these questions, there seems to be no good reason for assuming that the political forms of the socialist future must necessarily follow those of the capitalist past.

Those who stubbornly think in capitalist terms will, of course, reject this entire line of reasoning as unfounded and utopian. They cannot believe that it is possible for the interests of a leadership to be parallel to those of a people as a whole. Under capitalism, they are absolutely right. But under socialism, the leadership prospers *with* society, not against it; and by continuously raising the level of society, the leadership must sooner or later transform itself from master into servant.

It must be stressed, however, that this is a *long-run* perspective. Soviet public opinion is still a long way from being genuinely well-informed or sophisticated, to say nothing of self-forming. Most Soviet citizens have still had no more than primary schooling; secondary schooling for the upcoming generation will not be universal until 1960; in the universities, there is as yet room for only about one out

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of every 15 to 20 candidates; what is taught under the heading of Marxism-Leninism is for the most part crude and mechanical; reporting of world events in the Soviet press is far from complete and often misleading; available accounts of the USSR's own history still suffer from all the falsifications and distortions of the Stalin period; and so forth and so on. Conditions are being improved in all these respects; and particularly in the field of education, Soviet plans are incomparably more far-reaching and ambitious than anything ever envisaged by a capitalist society. Sooner or later, there is hardly any doubt, the Soviet public will rise far above the highest capitalist level both in knowledge and culture, and when that time comes genuine socialist democracy will become not only possible but inevitable. But this is at best a slow process, and in the meantime there is no reason to expect any sudden or drastic transformation of the relation between public and leadership. Methods are changing, but the system of tutelage itself, which has very deep roots both in Russian and Communist history, will remain for a long time to come —probably until, like Stalinist methods, it has not only outlived its positive functions but has become an obvious and obtrusive barrier to the further development of Soviet society.

The Twentieth Congress and Communist Theory

In the realm of theory, the Twentieth Congress stressed a number of points which may be summarized as follows:

(1) The capitalist system as a whole is falling ever deeper into crisis, but this does not mean that total production must necessarily shrink, nor does it preclude rapid expansion in some countries and at some times. This is a much more flexible position than that enunciated in 1952, both in Malenkov's report on behalf of the Central Committee to the Nineteenth Congress and in Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. There is still much that is vague, ambiguous, or dogmatic in Khrushchev's analysis of the situation in the capitalist world, but on the whole one can only welcome the abandonment of the rigidly unrealistic position with which the Soviet leadership saddled itself at the Nineteenth Congress.

(2) War is not inevitable—between capitalist and socialist countries or among capitalist countries. Leading Soviet spokesmen have said as much on various occasions, but Stalin's dictum in *Economic Problems* that war will remain inevitable as long as imperialism lasts had never been formally and officially repudiated until the Twentieth Congress.

(3) Communist countries are not interested in exporting revolution. This had been said on the highest authority many times—and never better than in a passage which Malenkov quoted from

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Stalin at the 1952 Congress—but Khrushchev went out of his way to emphasize the point and to explain what Communists *do* mean when they say that socialism will inevitably triumph all over the world. This is such a favorite topic with reactionaries in this country that it may be worth while to reproduce a part of Khrushchev's argument:

> To this day the enemies of peace allege that the Soviet Union is out to overthrow capitalism in other countries by "exporting" revolution. It goes without saying that among us Communists there are no supporters of capitalism. But this does not mean that we have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism still exists. . . . It is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order. We often hear representatives of bourgeois countries reasoning thus: "The Soviet leaders claim that they are for peaceful coexistence between the two systems. At the same time they declare that they are fighting for Communism, and say that Communism is bound to win in all countries. Now if the Soviet Union is fighting for Communism, how can there be any peaceful coexistence with it?" This view is the result of bourgeois propaganda. The ideologists of the bourgeoisie distort the facts and deliberately confuse questions of ideological struggle with questions of relations between states in order to make the Communists of the Soviet Union look like advocates of aggression.
>
> When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the two systems . . . this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries. Our certainty of the victory of Communism is based on the fact that the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production. . . . We believe that all working men in the world, once they have become convinced of the advantages Communism brings, will sooner or later take the road of struggle for the construction of socialist society. . . . We have always held and continue to hold that the establishment of a new social system in one or another country is the internal affair of the peoples of the countries concerned.

To which, we would hope, every sincere socialist will say "amen."

(4) In the world as it is constituted today—with one third of the population living under socialism and more than half in a "zone of peace"—legal and non-violent forms of transition to socialism become possible in some countries and under some conditions. This is by no means a brand-new Marxist theory, of course. Marx himself stated on a number of occasions the belief that socialism might come legally and peacefully in Britain and the United States. Lenin repudi-

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ated this view during World War I, but already by 1924 Stalin was envisaging the possibility—which, to be sure, he still put off to the "distant future"—of a peaceful transition in countries where capitalist encirclement had given place to socialist encirclement. The truth is that Marxists have changed their minds many times about the possibilities of peaceful transition, and the stand now enunciated by the Soviet leadership is a perfectly logical application of traditional Marxist ideas to mid-twentieth-century conditions.[5]

We ought to add, however, that Khrushchev's attempts to explain when and where a peaceful transition may be possible do not strike us as entirely successful. "In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal," he tells us, "the reactionary forces will of course inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class, revolutionary struggle." The meaning of this would clearly seem to be that the transition will be violent in the strongest capitalist countries, which presumably means in the first instance Britain and the United States. In our view, this is an example of essentially unhistorical, mechanical theorizing. The truth is that in countries where "capitalism is still strong" there just won't be any transition of any kind: there never has been, and there is no reason to assume that there will be. It will only be *after* capitalism ceases to be strong—either materially or in the minds of the people living under it—that the problem of the transition will arise at all. And when that time comes, there is no reason to exclude the possibility of peaceful transition.

On the whole, the theoretical contributions of the Twentieth Congress are all geared to the perspective of a lengthy period of peaceful coexistence and competition between the systems. No automatic collapse of capitalism is to be expected; war is not inevitable; the Communist countries are not interested in exporting revolution; and at least in some capitalist countries a peaceful transition to socialism is possible. Intertwined with these themes, and no doubt standing both in a cause and in an effect relation to them, is the recurring idea that the socialist system has *already* proved its superi-

5 We say this with the greater assurance since early in World War II one of us foresaw that the postwar world would be characterized by a competition between the systems and that as socialism proved its inherent superiority the transition in the remaining capitalist countries would become progressively easier. "Under these circumstances . . . a peaceful transition to socialism would for the first time become a genuine possibility. If . . . democratic forms in the Anglo-American countries were to survive . . . it would now be possible to fill them with a socialist content." P. M. Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development,* 1942, p. 362. The whole chapter in which this passage occurs may be profitably read today.

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ority and will certainly win out in the long run. *"In the mind of mankind,"* says an italicized passage in Mikoyan's speech, *"socialism is already incomparably stronger than capitalism."* And speaker after speaker called upon the capitalists, especially of the United States, to accept the test of peaceful competition. Let "those arrogant Americans who plume themselves on their wealth today, on 'their American way of life,'" said Mikoyan, "enter into competition with us . . . and see where more will be done for the good of the people, whose way of life will prove better. Let them engage in such competition instead of engaging in the arms drive. We, the Soviet people, and the American people, too, find such competition more to our liking."

It is a good challenge, issued in all seriousness. One of the crucial problems of the period ahead is the extent to which the American ruling class proves capable of responding to it. So far, it must be said, they show few signs of an intelligent or effective response, but it is still too soon to conclude that they are permanently unable to do better. In the meantime, let us record our own conviction that the job of socialists in capitalist countries, and especially in the United States, is not to try to help the capitalists make the system work better, but rather to prove to the peoples still living under it that it is an evil and wasteful system which must be replaced for reasons both moral and material.

The Future of the American Communist Party

The downgrading of Stalin and the revelations about his methods naturally have had a bombshell effect in the world Communist movement. It has always been a prime article of Communist faith that the Soviet Communist Party could do no wrong, and for many years Stalin was virtually identified with the Soviet Party. Under the circumstances, the discovery that Stalin was anything but infallible and that his regime had been guilty of using the most horrible methods inevitably came as a psychological shock to Communists.

We do not for a moment wish to minimize the difficulties which all this will create for the non-Soviet Communist Parties, and it is clear that these difficulties will be especially severe for those CPs which, like the French, have deliberately fostered their own personality cults. There can be little doubt that many members or sympathizers, who have taken Communist propaganda at face value and bitterly resent being shown up as fools or dupes, will leave the movement. And it is unlikely that any of the Western Communist Parties, at least, will recover, let alone gain strength, unless or until they succeed in getting rid of their own poisonous heritage from the Stalin era. And yet it seems to us that in the long run the real challenge of the Twentieth Congress to the Communist Parties of the capitalist

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countries lies in a different direction.

Whatever Communist theory may have said about peaceful coexistence in the past, the non-Soviet CPs have never succeeded in acting consistently and for any length of time as though they believed in it. To be sure, there have been exceptional periods, especially the last years of World War II when the Western powers and the USSR were working effectively together. But the broad generalization holds. Communists have, perhaps inevitably, thought in terms of an eventual war between capitalism and socialism. From this arose a whole set of attitudes and policies which may or may not have been appropriate under the assumption of an eventual war between the systems, but which most certainly are not appropriate under the assumption of peaceful coexistence.

The Twentieth Congress has now proclaimed peaceful coexistence to be the very cornerstone of Soviet doctrine and policy, and it has done so in a way that cannot possibly be mistaken for mere propaganda tactics. In the past, peaceful coexistence may have been a fervent hope; now it is a stubborn reality rooted in the new world power balance. The Soviet leadership has recognized it as such and is already acting on the basis of it. So far as we can see, the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries have not yet faced up to it. The Twentieth Congress challenges them to do so, and to draw the implications for their own future as revolutionary socialist parties.

This challenge presents enormous problems which we can no more than hint at in the present context. And we have no hesitation in saying that our knowledge and understanding is too limited to allow us as yet to arrive at any clear opinions about many of them. But we think we do know something about the problems of the advanced capitalist countries, and especially the United States, and we want to conclude with a few comments on the way the American Communist Party seems to be meeting the challenge of the Twentieth Congress.

We start from a conviction, which has been growing on us for a long time now, that the Communist movement in the capitalist world is ill-equipped to cope with the problems of peaceful coexistence. The heart of the matter is that under conditions of peaceful coexistence, the central task of socialist parties (including CPs) cannot be defense of the Soviet Union and/or postponement of war between the systems. The Soviet Union (with its allies) is now able to defend itself, and the preservation of peace has become an aim of even the majority of the ruling classes of the capitalist countries. What this means is that the business of socialist parties must now become socialism; and here, as the Twentieth Congress clearly stated, every country must find its own way. But for a socialist party in

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one of the highly industrialized countries, finding its own way is simply not compatible with marching in step with a monolithic international movement.

Let us emphasize that this contradiction is not a matter of whether it is admissible in principle for a socialist party to take its directives from an international center: there would be no objection if the international center were capable of solving the problems of the various national parties. But the point is that this is just what an international center *cannot* do. At least as far as the advanced capitalist countries are concerned, the decisive problems are national problems and can only be solved at the national level. And only a party capable of thinking for itself and prepared to follow up the implications of its own analysis can hope to solve these problems successfully.[6]

Has the American Communist Party shown signs of measuring up to these standards in the period since the Twentieth Congress? We see no evidence of it.

To be sure, the columns of the Party press have been full of self-criticism and soul-searching. But this happened before, immediately after the deposition of Browder, without changing anything fundamental in the Party's structure or mode of operation. If the latest period of self-questioning had been undertaken on the Party's own initiative, we might regard it as evidence of a serious attempt to reappraise the American scene and the Party's role in it. But of course this was not the case: just as in the Browder episode, the initiative came entirely from abroad. For many individual Party members, no doubt, all this questioning and discussion will lead to liberation from the shackles and blinkers of the past. But the leadership seems hopelessly compromised, and institutions have their own stubborn forms of resistance to change and reform. The emancipated ones are much more likely to leave the Party than to succeed in making it over into an organization capable of solving the problems of the United States in a world of peaceful coexistence.

But this is not the occasion to argue the issue in detail. We simply record our own impression that the hard core of American Communism is running true to form. Since Stalinist methods have been dropped in the USSR, they will doubtless no longer be in vogue here. Freer discussion among Soviet citizens will find its reflection in freer discussion among American Communists. All this is to the good, if only because it will make Communists easier people to get

6 If we have understood him correctly, this is also the view of Joseph Starobin as expressed in his "Reply to Sweezy" in last month's MR. The remainder of this editorial may therefore be taken as a rejoinder to Starobin's piece.

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along with. But it is not enough to convince us that anything basic has happened or is likely to happen to the CP as such.

If we are wrong, time will reveal our mistake and we will be not only willing but happy to correct it. But if we are right, the decline of the American Communist Party, which has been going on for a decade now, is likely to continue until that party joins the Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Party in the museum of American political history. In that case, the American socialist movement will be left without any serious or effective organizations.

We cannot here undertake to discuss what can or ought to be done about it, though undoubtedly the time is coming, if it has not already arrived, when this problem will have to be squarely faced. For the present, in keeping with the general theme of this editorial, we want only to conclude with a few notes on what would seem to us to be an appropriate attitude for the American Left in general, and any organizations it may support in particular, to adopt toward the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist leadership.

(1) We recognize that they are building socialism, working closely with other countries that are also building socialism, and lending material, diplomatic, and moral support to colonial and backward peoples struggling for freedom and a better life. These are the most important facts of our time.

(2) We want to help as much as we can in this historic process and are convinced that the best way to do it is to fight our own reactionaries and build a strong socialist movement in our own country.

(3) We need and want their help, too, and are convinced that the best way for them to give it is to make socialism a better, more civilized, more humane, more democratic society as rapidly as they can. This is by far the most effective form of socialist propaganda in the second half of the twentieth century.

(4) We will criticize them whenever we think they are wrong or fail to live up to socialist standards. For example, we have no hesitation in saying that their treatment of the whole problem of political offenses and political prisoners is still far below decent civilized standards. Every political prisoner should be accounted for, and all should be promptly released who cannot be shown to have had a fair trial by the judicial standards the Soviet leadership now professes to adhere to. In many other respects, the situation in the socialist countries with regard to the rights and freedoms of the individual is still entirely unsatisfactory, and we believe it is the duty of all socialists to say so.

(5) Finally, we believe that socialists everywhere—in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States—should never allow themselves

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to forget for a moment that socialism is more than an economic system. It is also the embodiment of mankind's age-old dream of a freer and better life. Right now is the time for all of us to redouble our efforts to make that dream come true. (June 15, 1956)



"ARISE YE PRISONERS OF ADULATION"

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ON SOVIET THEMES

BY PAUL A. BARAN

I

That the present is but a fleeting moment between the past and the future was never so vividly clear to me as in the five weeks that I spent in Moscow recently. During that time I spoke to many people: to ordinary citizens, the proverbial "man in the street," students, university teachers, scientific workers, and writers, to both members and non-members of the Communist Party. Some of them I have known for as long as thirty years, others I just encountered. Some of them knew that I was a foreigner, others did not. Some of them spoke freely, with abandon, "letting their hair down," behaving as if this was the long-awaited opportunity for talking about things they could not discuss before, for saying all that they had on their minds. Others were formal, restrained, weighing every word and studiously avoiding any "ticklish" subjects, anything that might be interpreted as an indiscretion. Yet all of them, those who talked much and those who talked little, those who treated me as an old friend and those who acted as if they were representatives of one power talking to an ambassador of another—all of them without exception stressed one point: the paramount, indeed, the sole purpose of the current analysis of the past is to derive lessons for the future. And the principal lesson for the future that all of them draw, that all of them consider to be of overriding importance, is that what has happened in the last 20 years of the Stalin era must not, and—what is most significant—*need* not happen again. It is the ability to look at things in historical perspective, the capacity for comprehending current events as aspects of the historical process, that is most striking about Soviet people to-day, about old and young, about the highly educated ones and those with only rudimentary knowledge. For regardless of the primitivized, vulgarized, and distorted form in which it was frequently presented to them—it was after all Marxian thought in which they were steeped, it was the philosophy of historical materialism in which they were brought up. In their profound conviction that the tragic and sordid aspects of the Stalin regime will not reappear, they are by no means naively optimistic or guided merely by wishful thinking. It has escaped them no more than many foreign

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observers that the present men on top were all members of the Stalin team, for the most part selected and appointed by him, and thus to a large extent co-responsible for his policies. If they feel nevertheless that the Stalin system is now a thing of the past, that what has occurred need not occur again—their strong sense of history gives them good reasons for their confidence.

II

One of these reasons has to do with the specific circumstances that gave rise to the Stalin dictatorship. When so many people talk in Moscow today about the return to Leninist principles, they realize fully that what is at issue is not merely the *desirability* of such a return but the *applicability* of those principles to Soviet reality. Indeed, the period of Lenin's leadership in the Soviet state differed in a crucially important respect from the time in which Stalin was at its helm. Lenin led a revolutionary movement that in the critical months of 1917 was carried by massive popular support. Having written on its banners "Peace," it had the enthusiastic backing of a huge army that was exhausted and bled white by a senseless and disastrous war. Having associated itself with the peasants' age-old craving for land, it could rely on the sympathy and cooperation of a large stratum of the rural masses. In nationalizing capitalist enterprise that was swollen with war profits, it was fulfilling the aspirations of the majority of urban workers. Accordingly, there was little terror during the first phase of the Revolution. It assumed major proportions only considerably later when foreign intervention and the formation of White Armies resulted in a Civil War, and it was directed exclusively against the resistance of the former ruling classes, against attempts to overthrow the revolutionary government. By 1921 political repression was greatly reduced, the activities of the Cheka were markedly curbed, and life in the country was essentially normalized.

The situation was altogether different when Stalin undertook his "revolution from above"—the forced collectivization of Russian agriculture. For that drive—carried out with terrifying speed and ruthlessness—there was no popular support. There was undoubtedly enthusiasm among parts of the urban population for the program of industrialization, for the construction of industrial enterprises and power stations; there was none when it came to the collectivization of agriculture. Indeed, if the 1917 Revolution gave land to the peasants, the 1929-1930 "revolution from above" was interpreted as taking it away from them. While in 1917 the objective conditions and the outlook of the Russian peasantry were "ripe" for a bourgeois agrarian revolution, in 1929 neither the material prerequisites nor

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the attitude of the peasantry were "ripe" for a socialist transformation of the village. There was not even much sympathy for such a transformation among industrial workers, most of whom were freshly recruited from the villages and were strongly influenced by the sentiment prevailing in the countryside.

Under such circumstances the collectivization—if it was to be carried out at all—*could* be carried out only *against* the people, that is only with the help of massive political repression. The secret police turned from an administrative *instrument* of the regime into its principal *political* foundation. As the deportations and terror in the countryside assumed major proportions, as the food crisis associated with the industrialization effort and accentuated by the upheavals caused by collectivization contributed to the spreading and deepening of general discontent, the role of the OGPU became increasingly prominent. It supplanted the Party organizations which to a larger or lesser degree reflected grass root opinion, and rapidly developed a vested interest in its own preservation and aggrandizement. Its apparatus and power became all-pervasive, and it continued its expansion at a time when the original need for repression all but disappeared. In fact—and this is crucially important—it was precisely at the time when the political and economic development in the country rendered the maintenance of police terror increasingly redundant and harmful, that the OGPU undertook everything in its (prodigious) power to strengthen and to perpetuate its sway over the nation. It was not fortuitous that it was at the end of 1934 when the overall economic and political situation had markedly improved, when both industrialization and collectivization had achieved considerable successes, that Kirov was murdered in Leningrad, and that that murder was seized upon as a signal for mass extermination of all elements in the Party that might have stood in the way of the OGPU dictatorship.

Two factors were primarily responsible for its ability to accomplish that end. One was that Stalin, who had commenced by *using* the OGPU in enforcing the policy of industrialization and collectivization, became rapidly identified with its apparatus, became indeed its leader and its exponent. Having never had much popularity and status *within the Party,* having received strong indications of mounting intra-party opposition towards his authoritarian rule at the Seventeenth Party Congress (January-February 1934) where, as I learned in Moscow, a very large number of delegates voted against him in a secret ballot, Stalin sought support outside of the Party and found in the OGPU the mechanism that enabled him to establish his position of paramount power. Stalin's profound distrust of the Party and his hostility towards its leading echelons where he was always outclassed and outranked in the past led him to a complete

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amalgamation with the OGPU, an amalgamation upon the stability of which both became wholly dependent. It made it possible for Stalin increasingly to disregard the Party and to have the OGPU organize his elevation to the status of an infallible leader; it made it possible for the OGPU to be powerfully backed and protected by Stalin. This system could, however, prevail for any length of time only in an atmosphere of acute danger. Such an atmosphere was continuously created and recreated by the OGPU with the connivance and, indeed, instructions of Stalin.

And this brings us to the second factor that played a tremendous role in the consolidation of the Stalin-OGPU regime. This was Hitler's rise to power in Germany. Representing from the very beginning a *real* threat to the security of the Soviet Union, German fascism was incessantly and most successfully used by Stalin and the OGPU as a reason for an intensified campaign against all potential opposition to their absolute rule. This campaign reached altogether macabre proportions in the late '30s; it was explained by the necessity of suppressing all elements of a possible "Fifth Column" in the country—an explanation that was widely accepted both inside and outside of the Soviet Union. The sense of emergency justifying maximal "vigilance" and serving as a rationalization for incessant application of political repression could obviously be easily driven to a pitch in the years of war. Its maintenance after the war became facilitated by the internal difficulties that had to be overcome in the first years of post-war reconstruction, and later by the stresses and strains of the "cold war." When, by 1952, the rationalization of the OGPU terror by the existence of emergency and external danger was wearing increasingly thin, the "doctors' plot" was manufactured by the OGPU and Stalin to give the philosophy of "vigilance" a new lease on life.

But if the need for a repressive regime for the success of the industrialization and collectivization program was becoming highly questionable as early as 1934, and manifestly absent in 1937—the year of the greatest triumph of Soviet industrial and agricultural construction—in the '50s the Stalin-OGPU reign of terror lost all conceivable *raison d'être*. The economy had been making rapid strides, the foundations of a socialist order were firmly laid, popular loyalty towards the principles of socialism was unquestionable, the basic structure of the Soviet society was securely grounded in broad popular support. In that setting, the Stalin-OGPU tyranny became not only politically superfluous but a formidable threat to the further development of the Soviet Union. It imposed untold suffering on millions of people, it stifled the intellectual life of the country, it jeopardized the efficient functioning of the economy, it affected adversely the evolution of other socialist countries, and it increased the danger

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of war. Its abolition became desperately overdue; the death of Stalin was not the *cause* of its liquidation. This kind of government would have been liquidated sooner or later in any case. The death of Stalin made its liquidation possible at the time at which it actually began.

III

This poses a question of overriding importance to the theory of socialism in general and to us, Western socialists, in particular. I raised it with many people in Moscow, and the resulting discussion was most illuminating. Broadly speaking, the problem is the relation of socialism to democracy. Can socialism be attained by the Socialist Party's securing the approval of the majority of the people in any given country with that approval resulting from a process of systematic persuasion and enlightment, or can socialism become a reality only by being imposed upon society by a more or less sizeable minority hoping to be *eventually* borne out by popular support? Furthermore, can socialism be attained so as to fully safeguard the interests of the opposing minority, or are the interests of that minority to be sacrificed whichever way the transition to socialism may take place? While I plan to return to this broad issue in a subsequent article, it may be worth while now to consider briefly such thoughts on the matter as relate directly to Soviet experience. Indeed, does not the argument of the previous section imply that the Stalin-OGPU regime, the mass ruination of the so-called kulaks, and the terrorization of the nation *during* the collectivization campaign were essentially justified? Does not that line of reasoning accept the position suggested in Khrushchev's first report to the Twentieth Party Congress and in Mikoyan's speech delivered in the debate of this report, that Stalin's terror was wholly damnable during the *last* 20 *years of his life* (that is since the murder of Kirov in 1934) without being reprehensible during the preceding 5 years when millions of people were destroyed in the course of the collectivization campaign? And does not this position in turn mean that terror is being "sorted out," with terror applied (in this case) to peasants condoned, but with terror directed against outstanding Party members condemned? Putting it differently, is the terroristic enforcement of collectivization upon an unwilling peasantry for the sake of industrialization and construction of socialism to be considered legitimate, while the massacre of Communists who were possibly to some extent expressing the sentiment of the masses to be treated as a crime?

Looking at the problem from a somewhat different angle, it may be asked whether—given the costs of collectivization and industrialization—the original decisions to undertake both were justified? And there can hardly be any doubt that in assessing those costs one has to take into account not only the terroristic activities of the Stalin-

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OGPU regime *during* the collectivization drive proper, but everything that has happened in the course of the subsequent years. For it is only on the basis of and with the help of the power that Stalin gained in 1929-1934 that he was able to do what he did in 1934-1953.

These questions were hotly debated in Moscow in various circles, and the answers to them that I heard suggested little of the uniformity and streamlining of opinion that some travellers discover after one week's stay in Moscow's Hotel Metropole. There were some people who expressed themselves unequivocally to the effect that Stalin's (*and* the Communist Party's) policy of industrialization and collectivization was a tremendous, tragic blunder, and that the correct course would have been to move slowly along the lines suggested by the right-wing opposition: aiming at a gradual improvement of living conditions in the village and a "cotton-goods industrialization" in the cities. The number of people holding this view was, however, conspicuously small—even after the terrible revelations contained in Khrushchev's second (secret) report to the Twentieth Party Congress became widely known.

Most of those to whom I talked, as well as of those who talked among themselves in my presence, argued that the basic policy of the Soviet Government in the course of the industrialization and collectivization campaigns was essentially correct, that it was fully borne out by subsequent experience, that in its absence Russia would have lost the war, with the suffering resulting therefrom greatly surpassing all the misery that was endured under Stalin. They were convinced that both industrialization and collectivization were indispensable if the country was to move forward, that under the specific conditions prevailing in Russia in those days there was no way of achieving that end without compulsion—even if the compulsion actually employed was excessive. What was most remarkable: nearly all the people whom I saw, whether roundly condemning Stalin and everything associated with him or whether recognizing his achievements and deploring his excesses, nearly all of them stressed with great pride and emotion that in striking the balance of the Stalin era, one must not forget to give full weight to the role that the sacrifices of the Soviet people and their spectacular successes in socialist construction have played in the advancement of socialism in the world. It is on the basis of those sacrifices and those successes—they stressed—that other countries in the socialist camp, but in particular China, are able today to avoid many of the pitfalls and hardships that would have been otherwise inevitable.

And in any case—I was told in a discussion that I had with a group of students—the questions that I asked could not be treated in an abstract, unhistorical way. They could be approached only

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with reference to concrete situations. For the Soviet Union today—all of them agreed—the issues no longer exist. For *now* future progress is *not* predicated upon the methods adopted by Stalin. Now the Soviet Union is in a position to continue and to widen its advance towards socialism with the full consent and indeed enthusiastic co-operation of the people.

IV

This points to another reason for the generally prevailing belief that terror and compulsion need not reappear in Soviet life. It is the breathtaking change that has taken place in the structure of Soviet society in the course of the last 30 years. For the country is dominated now by a new generation which, tempered by the struggle for industrialization and hardened by the ordeals of the war, is unique in its moral strength, its patriotism, and the level of its knowledge and insight. This generation that is now everywhere in the driver's seat displays in every aspect of national life its craving for education, for opportunity for unhampered development, for freedom, and for justice. This generation reads voraciously the best in the world's literature, overflows the universities, concentrates in the most difficult areas of science, mobs lecture halls and responds with spontaneous ovations to the Comédie Française, to David Oistrach, to Emile Gilels, to Porgy and Bess, and to a good paper on the "Relation of Dialectical Logic to Formal Logic". . . . This generation is impatient with the "old-timers" who fill their books and articles with stale citations, who have lost the ability of thinking for themselves, who cover their intellectual indolence by reference to authority. The mental frame of reference of Soviet youth was not drawn by the OGPU; it was drawn by the writings of Marx and Engels, of Pushkin and Tolstoy, of Shakespeare and Goethe, that were printed and reprinted in the Soviet Union in millions of copies. Its ideas were not shaped by Stalin's hangmen assassinating innocent people, nor were they formed by comic books extolling rape and murder. Its ideas were molded in schools and youth organizations where socialism, humanism, and devotion to the commonweal never ceased to be the content of education.

It is here where the fundamental difference lies between the fascist despotism of a Hitler or a Franco and the no less repulsive oriental tyranny of a Stalin. The difference is the *content* of the historical development that those dictatorships were able to enforce. If in the case of Hitler it was the unleasing of the most destructive, most bloody war in human history, if in the case of Franco it is continual misery and degradation of a great people—in the case of Stalin it is the creation of all the prerequisites for the development of a prosperous and free society. In the process of building the foun-

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dations of socialism in Russia, vast quantities of filth and refuse were flying in all directions and were obscuring the contours of what was being accomplished. Yet at the same time a generation was being brought up whose most pronounced characteristic is the urge to clean out the Augean stables, tear down the gallows, break up the concentration camps, get rid of the executioners and their apologists, and proceed from what has been attained to what still remains to be achieved. I am convinced that it was the irresistible pressure of Soviet youth that has transformed the slow, gradual "de-Stalinization" of 1953-1955 into the mighty eruption of 1956. And I am no less convinced that this pressure which gains momentum with every success that it attains will sweep before itself whatever may come into its way. It is the pressure of a great and irreversibly awakened people that will transform Russia—perhaps more rapidly than frequently assumed—into a free, socialist democracy.

Even here in Hong Kong, close as we are to the Chinese scene, we find it hard to keep pace with and to evaluate the day to day economic and industrial changes and developments which are so rapidly being evolved. Nor do we know, neither can we judge, how the Chinese people as a whole—and particularly the agricultural population— are reacting to the kaleidoscopic events which have affected their lives and livelihood so closely in the last few years.

Collectivization is certainly proceeding with ruthless vigor: at the same time almost the whole range of agricultural production is being directed and controlled from above in a way which has had no previous parallel in Asia. This line of policy is, of course, tied up with the current Five Year Plan and with industrialization. The whole picture reveals remarkable speed of development. There is special concentration on heavy industries with extensive Russian help. Railway and road communications are being opened up at an astonishing pace, even if allowances are made for some work of a rough and temporary nature.

The key point in the economic policy of China has been summarized as follows: To build a socialist society, which cannot be raised on the foundation of a small-peasant economy; its foundations must be based on large-scale industry and large-scale collective farming.

—Extract from the Report of the Ordinary Yearly General Meeting of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, by Mr. C. Blaker, Chairman, held on March 16th at the Head Office in Hong Kong.

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KRUSHCHEV AND THE JEWS

BY JOSHUA KUNITZ

I have been asked by the Editors to write an up-to-date postscript to my articles "The Jewish Problem in the USSR," which appeared in *Monthly Review* in March and April of 1953. The reason for the request was a feeling that perhaps my facts and my analysis would need some revision in the light of (1) the semi-official account of what happened to Jewish life and culture in the Soviet Union which was published in Poland in the April 4 issue of the Yiddish Communist newspaper *Folks-Shtimme* (reprinted in this country in the *Morning Freiheit* and, in English translation, in the May issue of *Jewish Life*); and (2) of Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin's treatment of some national minorities and Stalin's role in the "Jewish doctors' plot" (as published in the *New York Times,* June 5, 1956).

Actually, despite the surprised outcries in the Communist press in this country, the new "disclosures" disclose very little that is basically new. How easily, how eagerly the anonymous explainers in *Folks-Shtimme* have snatched up the new Soviet-fabricated clichés. To them everything is clear now: things went swimmingly with the Soviet Jews until the "malignant growth" of the "cult of personality" infected the healthy organism of the Soviet Union; this, naturally, caused "a certain distortion of the nationality policy," which distortion, in turn, "made it possible for the infamous Beria gang to provoke friction among the nationalities and brought about a certain growth of nationalism and anti-Semitism."

Just how the whole thing operated, they do not say. Nor do they show any sign of an awareness that in putting the blame for all the evils in the USSR on one individual they perpetuate, in an obverse way, the very theory and practice that, in the past, made possible their heaping of all the credit for USSR's achievements on the same individual. They perpetuate the very angel-or-devil conception of history which they are now purportedly engaged in decrying.

In their determination to make the new clichés stick, the *Folks-Shtimme* explainers resort to unconscionable manipulation of historical facts and dates. They shift the beginning of the destructive effects of "Beriaism" on Jewish culture to the late thirties, that is, to the

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period of the Yezhov purges, when Beria was not yet on the Moscow scene. They fail to mention the *spontaneous* outburst of intense nationalism among all the peoples of the Soviet Union, including the Jews, during the Nazi invasion. They slur over the numerous *real* (not imaginary) reasons for the recrudescence of popular anti-Semitism during the same war years. They ignore the impact of the birth of Israel, its role in the cold war, as well as its effect on the Soviet Jews and the Soviet Government. Indeed, the year 1948, so crucially significant in the life of Soviet Jewry, is not even mentioned, nor are the campaigns against "bourgeois nationalism" and "cosmopolitanism," nor the "Jewish doctors' plot." They pervert history, make unsubstantiated charges, and blithely ignore universally known facts. Refusing to come to grips with reality, they offer only one explanation for all Jewish, as well as non-Jewish, woes—the "cult of personality" and "destructive Beriaism."

Still, we can be grateful. It is always better to know the truth, and *Folks-Shtimme* fully confirms the havoc among Soviet Jews which we reported in *Monthly Review* three years ago, even adding a few gruesome details which we could not know then, but had long since come to suspect.

Now we are told officially that "the best sons and daughters of the Soviet Jewish masses—the Jewish anti-Fascist Committee, suddenly, and without why or wherefore, were liquidated and its leaders were condemned to death"; also that the Jewish writers and cultural leaders whom we had reported as having been "removed from the scene," were in fact executed—major novelists like David Bergelson and Der Nister, major poets like Perets Markish, Itsik Feffer, and David Hoffstein, and many other Yiddish writers, actors, scholars, and literary critics. However monstrous, these details fit into the picture as we presented it in 1953, and call for no elaboration.

What accounts for the peculiar circumstances under which these disclosures have been made? Why, one wonders, have the Soviet authorities withheld this information for so long? Why are the explanations published in *Folks-Shtimme* so mealy-mouthed, so lacking in candor, sense, and historical verisimilitude? Why were they leaked to an obscure Yiddish paper in Warsaw instead of being emblazoned on the front pages of the Soviet papers in Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, Odessa, and other cities, for the edification of the local populace, and especially the local anti-Semites? Why do the Soviet leaders in their public speeches and private confidences, in their articles and editorials, so studiously avoid mentioning the Jewish subject?

One reads Khrushchev's devastating exposé of Stalin's brutal treatment of several national minorities and is struck by the absence of any reference to the Jews—a strange omission, considering that

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the fate of Soviet Jewry, so clearly foreshadowed in the handling of other minorities, has been agitating the whole world during the last eight years. Khrushchev's exact words on this subject are worth reproducing:

> Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet Union is justly considered as a model of a multi-national state because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all nations which live in our great fatherland.
>
> All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet State. We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations, together with all Communists and Komsomols without exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations.
>
> Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a permanent break-through at the fronts of the great patriotic war benefiting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December, 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic.
>
> In March, 1944, all the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April, 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic and the republic itself was renamed the Kabardinian Autonomous Republic.
>
> The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have deported them also. (Laughter and animation in the hall.)
>
> Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists, and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

Those who have read my 1953 articles will hardly be startled by Khrushchev's present revelations. I mentioned all the nationalities named by Khrushchev, plus the Volga German and the Crimean Tartar Republics. "Altogether," I then wrote, "for their disloyalty four major and several minor nationalities were expunged from the ethnographic map of the USSR." Anticipating Khrushchev by several years, I underscored the violation of Soviet precedent and legality embodied in these actions. I wrote: "It should be noted that this

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procedure signified a deviation from the traditional Soviet approach to social phenomena. Instead of inimical classes, whole populations—workers, peasants, intellectuals—were subjected to wholesale punishment by being deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to national existence." Also, I indicated how this procedure was used as a precedent for violating the constitutional rights of the Jews. To be sure, I laid the blame at the door of the Soviet government, rather than Stalin personally, but in the absence of any objective evidence substantiating Stalin's guilt in initiating the persecutions, I prefer to adhere to my own formulation, especially since blaming the government of which Stalin was the head in no way exonerates Stalin.

How much significance is one to attach to Khrushchev's failure to include the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tartars, and the Jews in his list of persecuted peoples? Was this a mere lapse of memory? In the case of the Germans and the Tartars, was it because severe action was "dictated by military considerations" and hence in Khrushchev's view was justified? And in the case of the Jews, was it perhaps because what was done came later and under quite different circumstances and hence did not belong in a discussion of punishments, however unjust, meted out for wartime collaboration with Nazism?

But if lapse of memory or historical inappropriateness may explain Khrushchev's omission of the Jews in the paragraphs quoted above, they certainly cannot explain a similar omission in his discussion of the infamous case of the doctors. Here is Khrushchev's account of this matter:

> Let us also recall the "Affair of the Doctor Plotters." (Animation in the hall.) Actually there was no "affair" outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.
>
> Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons.
>
> He said the academician, Vinogradov, should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head." (Tumult in the hall.)

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Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him instructions, advised him on which investigative methods should be used; these methods were simple—beat, beat, and, once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested we members of the Political Bureau received protocols from the doctors; confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as he conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated. They are working in the same places they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

One of the remarkable features of this most remarkable account is the complete absence of any reference to Jews. Surely, Khrushchev knew, as most of his audience knew, that throughout the world this case has been known as the "Jewish Doctors' Case." Six of the nine accused doctors were Jews. Their published "confessions" were so phrased as to suggest that they had entered the criminal plot as Jews, in pursuit of Jewish bourgeois nationalist aims, and in secret collaboration with a Jewish Committee from the United States of America. When the case was first announced in the Soviet press, the outcry of Jewish indignation and dismay resounded through the world. There were meetings and protests. In Israel, feeling ran so high that a bomb was hurled into the Soviet consulate, an action which led to a suspension of diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR. Khrushchev, in an extensive account of the case, does not even utter the word Jew, and the proverbial man from Mars, reading that account, would not even suspect that the Jewish question was in any way involved in the ignominious affair! This is clearly not a lapse of memory. The reticence is deliberate, the lack of candor obvious.

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One is puzzled. Here is Khrushchev, calling an extraordinary secret session of the Communist Party Congress for the sole purpose of degrading Stalin. Here he is presenting an indictment of the dead leader, heaping detail upon horrible detail to prove that Stalin was an ogre, a beast, a maniac, a coward, and, in military and economic matters, an ignoramus. In the case of the doctors, Khrushchev had a marvelous opportunity to add the clinching epithet "anti-Semite" to all the other horrible Stalin epithets. What more devastating charge against a Communist than to call him an anti-Semite—this in a land where, according to the law, active anti-semitism is synonymous with counter-revolution? Khrushchev muffed the opportunity. He shrank away from it. Why? Was it that Stalin, despite his other sins, was not an anti-Semite? Or was it that Khrushchev himself in his innermost soul is not quite free from the anti-Semitic virus, and hence could not work up any indignation about the anti-Semitism of others?

Khrushchev's reticence on the Jewish question has also been attested to by André Philip, one of the twelve members of the French Socialist Party's Executive Council who visited the Soviet Union as a delegation in May, 1956. According to M. Philip, as reported in the *New York Times* (June 6, 1956), the French delegates prodded Khrushchev, during the two conferences they had with him, to express himself on the Jewish question.

> At their first meeting, the French official said, Mr. Khrushchev treated the Jewish question as a topic of small general interest. However, at the second conference, the Soviet leader seemed to be impressed by the visitors' insistence on the world importance of it and went to great lengths to assure his listeners that he was not anti-Semitic. He told the French that the Jews were considered to be like any other minority nationality, such as the Ukrainians or Georgians. The Jews, Mr. Khrushchev declared, have the same rights as other Soviet citizens, but no more. . . . The Jewish language is fading away and the majority of the Jews in the Soviet Union are learning Russian as the best way to obtain a livelihood in the modern Soviet state, M. Philip quoted Mr. Khrushchev as having said.

When I first read this report, I was most unpleasantly affected by the ominous little qualifying phrase "but no more." It seemed to imply that the Jews had not been satisfied with mere equality, that they had been reaching out for more than their just share, but that he, Khrushchev, and the ruling party of the Soviet Union which he heads, were adamantly set against such Jewish pretensions. In the face of what has actually been happening to Soviet-Jewish life and culture since the war, this "but no more" struck me as ineffably insensitive, crass. I sought consolation in the thought that perhaps the

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report, being two removes away from the source, was not quite complete or accurate.

Three days later, however, the *Jewish Daily Forward* published another dispatch from Paris concerning Khrushchev's discussion of the Jewish problem with the French Socialist delegation. Here the full meaning of "but no more" was spelled out. As quoted in the *New York Times* (June 10) the *Forward* dispatch read:

> Nikita S. Khrushchev reportedly told a French Socialist delegation in Moscow last month that the Soviet Union restricted the number of Jews in professional positions to the relative proportion of Jews in the Soviet population. . . . Mr. Khrushchev told the French Socialists that, in the early years after the Bolshevik Revolution, Jews occupied a disproportionately large number of high Soviet positions because the country had few trained people. Now, he was said to have contended, there are many trained Russians for responsible positions, so that the former proportion of Jews is no longer necessary.
>
> Mr. Khrushchev, according to the report, said the Soviet Government received frequent protests from the various Soviet Republics that too many Jews held desirable positions. He reportedly pressed Lazar M. Kaganovich, only high-ranking Soviet leader of Jewish origin, to confirm his statements, which Mr. Kaganovich finally did, saying one word, "correct."

If accurately quoted, Khrushchev's remarks are truly frightening. Are we to understand that the Soviet leaders who have always insisted, even in the worst days of Stalin, on making a sharp distinction between socialistically-motivated opposition to bourgeois nationalism (Zionism) and counter-revolutionary anti-Semitism, are now blurring this distinction and yielding to the pressures of provincial anti-Semites? Are we to understand, that in response to these pressures a Jewish quota has been introduced in the Soviet professions, professional schools, and governmental posts? Are we to understand that the notorious *numerus clausus,* used by the Tsars in old Russia and by anti-Semites everywhere, has been secretly operating in the land of socialism? Are we to understand that a Jew, no matter how able and how loyal, may be kept from schools, professions, and responsible positions simply because he is a Jew? Is this Khrushchev's conception of the national equality guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, of Socialist justice, of Soviet humanism? Small wonder he felt impelled to assure his French listeners that he was no anti-Semite! The very thought that a Soviet leader, a Communist, should need to utter such assurances, and under foreign socialist prodding at that, is a measure of the great moral tragedy that has befallen the Soviet Union and the Communist movement.

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One is loath to accept such terrible conclusions on the basis of second-hand and, probably, inimical reports. But what other recourse does one have, when Khrushchev stubbornly refuses to discuss the Jewish question in the open? What makes it even more difficult is that this lack of forthrightness in dealing with the Jews is not, it seems, the personal idiosyncracy of Khrushchev. It characterizes the behavior of *all* the Soviet leaders in this matter. Speeches, speeches, and more speeches, endless denunciations of the "cult of personality," endless veiled and open animadversions against Stalin, endless paeans of praise to the fairness and justice of "collective leadership," but not one speech, not one editorial, not one article, not one sentence, not one word in the Soviet press about the Jews. If we did not know the contrary, we might conclude that there are no more Jews in the Soviet Union and that therefore there is no more Jewish problem. There are between two and three million Soviet Jews, but we know next to nothing of their present status, life, thoughts, or their relations to their non-Jewish neighbors. And it is, alas, only from a second-hand French source that we are constrained to garner some dubious information concerning Khrushchev's and the Soviet government's attitude toward the Jews; and it is only from a second-hand Polish-Jewish source that we have finally obtained, after years of fruitless inquiries, cables, and visits to Soviet embassies, a belated, confused, and far from candid account of what happened to the Jews in the last grim years of the Stalin era.

Why?

The best answer I can give is this: Because of past injustices and strains, the Jewish subject has become so sensitive in the Soviet Union, so charged with secret and widespread feelings of shame and guilt on the one side and of resentment and bitterness on the other, that a taboo—perhaps mostly unconscious but in many cases quite conscious, too—has become strongly operative. The Jews are too painful and embarrassing to think about, let alone to talk and write about.

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CRITIQUE OF THE STALIN ERA

BY ANNA LOUISE STRONG

The most hopeful event in years for worldwide Marxist thinking is the critique of the Stalin era now going on. This is a period long awaited, when the total results of these decades of building socialism are up for review. But we shall benefit only as we analyze honestly, soberly. The commercial press naturally distorts; it delights to use the revelations about Stalin to divert attention from the truly stupendous achievements reported by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Such attack is expected. It is a matter of more concern when good friends who last year refused to speak to me because Stalin's police once called me a spy, now gently chide that I fail to realize "the full extent of Stalin's crimes." To make this a devil-hunt on Stalin gets us nowhere.

It is therefore good to know that dotted around our planet, unlisted on any "party tickets," are sane thinkers like an eighty-year old pacifist who writes me from Louisiana. She is shocked by the "blame heaped on a man who can no longer defend himself," by those who "but for him, would have no socialist country now at all." She finds many acts of Stalin reprehensible: his treatment of kulaks, his purge of Old Bolsheviks, his "unpardonable rewriting of history" to shut Trotsky out of the early organization of the Red Army. But Stalin was "absolutely right" in that controversy on "building socialism in one country," and even in exiling Trotsky, who otherwise might have "wrecked things." So this traducing worries her. "For if the Revolution of the USSR should crumble as Mexico's did, that would be the greatest tragedy in all human history." She ends: "I would rather face the Bar of Heaven as Stalin than as Truman, Dulles, Brownell, J. Edgar Hoover, or Churchill. Wouldn't you?" I think I might write many days and pages, and hardly better this summary of hers.

My correspondent sets eyes from afar—even from Louisiana—on the main issue: "Revolutions have failed before; this one mustn't." On this at least, I wish to reassure her. For while ideals and systems do degenerate, and no achievement of man is secure without vigilance, yet the signs are that the present Russian discussion shows victory rather than failure; that it moves, not to a reversal of socialism, but

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to transform the strategy of "building socialism in one country" into the strategy of building relations among socialist states that comprise now one third of the world.

The present ruthless superseding of Stalinism comes precisely because Stalin's policy succeeded far beyond what anyone dreamed when it was adopted those twenty-eight years ago. Khrushchev's keynote speech to the Congress makes clear that since 1928, when the Five Year Plans began, industrial output in the USSR has grown twenty-fold, while output of electrical energy has been multiplied thirty-four times! Men do not live by electric power alone. Nonetheless this is victory unchallenged, even if it was won at heavy cost. It is on that increase of economic might, made in the Stalin era, that Soviet leaders can now announce a fuller democracy at home and a more easy-going friendliness abroad.

We of the outside world have also a vital interest. Whether we see socialism as threat or promise, we must know what evils attended its first building, how they arose, and whether they can in future be avoided. I was at first annoyed that the editors of *Monthly Review* bade me "frankly write from the point of view of one who was a victim of the worst aspects" of the Stalin days. I do not like myself in the role of martyr; mine was a small casualty compared to millions of others. And a soldier who fancies himself a military expert, does not normally sum up a great campaign "from the viewpoint of a man who got hit." Nonetheless my unjust arrest and the smashing of my worldwide career by deportation under the false charge of "spy," was a direct contact with what I have always considered the "worst aspect" of the Stalin era: the overwhelming, arbitrary power of the Political Police. If we include the other aspects of repression—the distortion of history and science, the repression of Jewish culture, the gradual suppression of discussion even within the party, and other violations of what had been proudly called "Soviet democracy"—then I think we have listed the basic evils that the Soviet people have to overcome.

Most other criticism now made of Stalin seems to me either doubtful or trivial. It is true that Soviet foreign policy was rigid, and based on suspicion; how else could they feel secure in an encirclement by stronger foes? There were all the time plenty of plots to overthrow them; Washington occasionally invests $100,000,000 for that purpose, and *U. S. News & World Report* has just published a frank account of the comings and goings of agents still trying to overthrow the Soviet power. It is true that the break with Yugoslavia was a bad blunder; but the Yugoslavs in part asked for it, and the blunder was not much worse than Dulles commits almost any day. As for the charge that Stalin failed to prepare properly for the

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Hitler invasion, I shall have more to say below.

To the claim that Stalin substituted "one-man rule" for "collective decision," I can only say that I never heard anyone in the USSR speak of "Stalin's orders" but only of "the party line"; that it was Stalin who had the Constitution first drawn up by a committee of the ablest political scientists and then discussed and amended by millions of suggestions from meetings throughout the land; that when Marie Demchenko, an early farm heroine, gushingly told Stalin she had wanted to come to Moscow "to see the leaders" he deftly replied: "But now you also are leaders"; that on many occasions Stalin said "individual decisions" were apt to be wrong. But if Stalin's close co-workers now say he became an autocrat, I will not challenge them, for they should know.* I will only add that this is a natural tendency that grows with power; and that no preaching of "collective decisions" by Khrushchev will ensure the Soviet people against tyranny unless they themselves actively take part in self-rule.

The overweening power of the Political Police is therefore the greatest evil of the Stalin period. Was this an evil created by orders from Stalin, to be abolished by orders from Khrushchev now? I doubt it. I think it was born of the Tsarist tradition of despotism through the Black Hundreds, and nourished on Lenin's doctrine of "the Terror," which all good Communists said was needed, temporarily of course, to safeguard the Revolution. Such "Terrors" have attended other revolutions, both the American and the French. Nobody justifies them permanently. But it is easier to create a Political Police than to abolish it. It takes on a separate life, as we Americans find with the FBI. It becomes a "state within a state" with a vested interest in discovering and proving "plots," some of which really exist. Did Stalin invent the "plots," or did others invent them and convince Stalin, to keep the Political Police in power? According to Khrushchev, both were true. He says that Stalin was directly responsible for executing innocent people and instigating tortures. He adds that in these excesses Stalin believed he was acting for the good of the Revolution.

I saw many signs that the Political Police was a center of struggle, details of which may be revealed in years to come. The three chiefs who ran it successively—Yagoda, Yezhof, and Beria—were all violently removed, two by execution, one to a madhouse. Four times it was announced that the excessive powers would be abolished and the Political Police "brought under law"—"like Scotland Yard,"

* The Chinese Communists say his "practice" grew to be "in contradiction" to his own theory (Peking *People's Daily*, April 5). This penetrating analysis I accept.

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people said. The name was changed, but the power remained and grew. Can Khrushchev now bring this power under the law? Perhaps. If so, it is not that Khrushchev is better than Stalin but that time has matured for this change. Soviet economy is now established; socialism is the chosen way, not of one country but of one third of the world; Soviet people are no longer peasants, but citizens with socialist-formed minds.

I am not greatly impressed when I. F. Stone finds Russians "browbeaten" because they will not chatter to him as freely as he desires. Russians learned vigilance in a hard school till it became second nature. They will not abolish even "repressive safeguards" until they are sure it is "safe." But they move in that direction as they have long desired to do.

I will borrow here from my own experience. One reason I never attacked the USSR for the injustice I suffered was that in a deep sense I felt I had it coming. For years, I had seen scores of people, even my close friends, sent off to Siberia, unjustly. While I protested here and there to officials, I made no outcry to the world. Why then could I protest when the same injustice came to me? Then I asked: WHY had I made no outcry? And my answer was: "Because all those years I felt myself in the presence of something so vast, so important for all men's future, that it must not be halted or diverted, whatever the cost." If this was how I decided about others, then thus must I decide about myself.

I think that is what the Soviet people decided. My best woman friend, a professor of English, was exiled for ten years for being "the wife of an enemy of the people," though she was never told the nature of her husband's alleged crime. I met her again after nine years in Moscow; she had lived as teacher in a small town in Kazakstan. Once a month, she reported to an officer of the GPU and had "very interesting discussions" with him. He specially pried into her attitude towards her own sentence. Once her reply was, "When a railway train starts going places, what is the attitude of a fly brushed off by the wheel?" Another time she said: "I think the Nazi Fifth Column got into the GPU and penetrated high, and arrested the wrong people." This is another danger of all secret police; they are the first organizations penetrated by the foe.

Always life continued to struggle and mend itself. Nothing was ever as final as it seemed abroad. Engineers and theater directors, exiled from Moscow, built dams, factories, theaters in the backwoods. My friend spoke of her life in Kazakstan as "easier on the nerves than work in Moscow, but not so interesting." Meanwhile, the dockets of all deputies to the Supreme Soviet were full of appeals by constituents who claimed they were wrongly judged and asked appeal.

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I don't know how often they got it; there was little publicity. But I know George Andrechine was twice exiled and twice came back to higher jobs. And once I asked an official of the GPU whether a case I knew from 1937 could be appealed. He answered: "*Anything* that happened in 1937 can be appealed." Because of all these things, I do not see this arbitrary Police Power as an evil devised by Stalin, but as a weapon consciously forged in Lenin's day that was used, and abused, and that should never again be consciously chosen without much more thought.

Let us try to define the goal for which all this was endured, with varying protest but without outcry. I recall that I found Russia a land of illiterate peasants, where children crouched all winter indoors on the family oven, while the man used the one pair of boots to go out in the snow. Today all children trot to school in shoes. I recall those days when state farms, introducing a three-shift use of tractors, were stymied by inability to tell time at night, since nobody had a clock or a watch. This was the peasant country in which socialism was built!

Borodin put it best to me: "We Bolsheviks think that in spite of our technical backwardness, it may devolve on this country to save civilization for mankind. Man's destructive powers grow fast; half the capitalist world of the West already turns back to the Middle Ages. No god insures to men progress; civilizations have fallen before. We plan and struggle for peace in every possible way; yet we might see much of the world go up in flames. But if the worst comes to the very worst, the world need not sink back into Dark Ages as it has done before. We build the organization that can save it."

He was thinking not of abstract socialism but of socialism expressed in great cities beyond the Urals, with grain lands of Siberia between, protected by distance from even the collapse of nations. Built partly by exiles and partly by free labor, toiling on the same construction job, and alike winning the Order of Lenin for their work . . . . There is no simple way to separate the good in this from the evil. Men built in chaos believing this might save the world.

Well, didn't it? Have we forgotten the Europe of 1940 when the armies of France collapsed in eleven days before Hitler? When they said in Berlin: "We'll have London by September." (London was saved perhaps less by British valor than by the march of "neutral" Russia into Bessarabia, which made Hitler decide he must settle the Eastern front first.) All over Europe, I saw despair set in as men predicted another "Dark Age" perhaps for a thousand years. Lochner told me in Berlin: "Human flesh cannot stand against the blitz." When Hitler struck Russia, it was the mightiest onslaught ever known in history, and Washington predicted Moscow's collapse in a matter

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of weeks. Six weeks later, Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote in the *N. Y. Times*: "The stand of Russia has changed the outlook of London, Washington, and Europe-in-Exile." The "Washington Merry-Go-Round" explained: "Russian troops obviously defend something they cherish. They have what the French lacked—morale."

So the long retreat of the world's peoples before the forces of the Iron Heel was checked by the stand of the Red Army on the Eastern Front. The assault against humanity by the proclaimers of a Master Race against Slave Races, broke on the men of Stalingrad. Let military experts find military lacks as always; we nonexperts know that from 1928 onward the Stalin regime built precisely for this. They built feverishly, wastefully, ruthlessly, but they built strength that stood. And for this the world is in their debt today.

Nor should we ignore that the Soviet soldiers' morale was based on the consciousness that they were fighting, not for slave-labor camps but for "freedom": freedom from landlords, from capitalists, from imperialist invaders; and for their "property," both the small peasant gardens and the great publicly owned wealth whose benefits they already enjoyed and which they hoped one day to enjoy to the full; and for human dignity, which proudly made 182 nationalities all "equal citizens" of the USSR. Such is the paradox of all human building that, just as Americans may honestly defend their "freedom" while Joe McCarthy knifes it in the back, so Soviet soldiers honestly fought for the freedoms guaranteed by Stalin's Constitution even while Stalin himself outraged those guarantees. They fought and died believing that, if their land was once safe from foreign invaders, they could handle the home-made oppressors a later day.

Has that day come? Thus they announce it. And truly I think it advances, more gradually perhaps than the announcers claim. But if it now comes, this is because an economy was built and a generation matured through darker discipline, by building socialism in a land not fit for it, in a fight against the world and time. And if now they announce that no other land need use such methods, but each land may find socialism in its own manner, and war itself may be held at bay by the power of the "Peace Zone" through friendship of the socialist bloc with the neutralists, is not this because of the strong base that was built in the dark days? What would the world be now if there had been no Stalin era? I refer you to Jack London's *Iron Heel*.

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PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SOCIALISM

HAS THE COMMUNIST PARTY A FUTURE?

By Alexander Leslie

It is doubtful if any socialist believes that socialism will come to America automatically. There will be necessary some organized socialist group, deeply rooted among the American people and able to apply Marxism as a guide, not a dogma. Such a group does not yet exist. Probably a majority of socialists believe or have believed that the Communist Party could some day become such a group.

Many socialists, of course, have mentally written off the CP as futile and irrelevant. For all its errors and weaknesses, however, the CP is still far and away the most powerful socialist group in America. Its membership, decimated by the repressions of recent years (and by its own blunders) is still far larger than that of all other socialist groups put together. It controls the only socialist daily newspapers in this country. Above all, it possesses the enormous energy and courage which have always characterized its activities—never more than when it was wrong. What happens to the CP will, for years to come, powerfully affect, for good or evil, what happens to American socialism.

The recent revelations from the USSR and Eastern Europe have thrown into brilliant relief the years of Communist dogmatism and moral fence-straddling. Not that these revelations represent anything essentially new—most unaffiliated socialists and not a few Communists have long suspected that there was something rotten in the Soviet state, though many (including the writer) have been shocked to learn just how rotten they had become by 1952. The damning fact is that the Communist leadership has, for the fourth or fifth time, been caught utterly unprepared by a major shift in Soviet policy. This in turn raises as a practical question: does the future of American socialism lie with the CP? The writer frankly does not know the answer; following is the case for the prosecution:

The CP Is Politically Compromised

It has made too many mistakes during the past twenty years.

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To take merely the clearest examples:

(1) In 1939 it flatly denied even the possibility of a Soviet-German agreement.

(2) Its attitude toward Roosevelt was almost consistently uncritical—pro or con; it repeatedly shifted from hero-worship to abuse—sometimes almost overnight.

(3) In 1944 it propagated the most grotesque illusions concerning the post-war period.

(4) From 1945 on, it repeatedly predicted an economic crisis—on which expectation many of its policies were based—which has not yet arrived (though no doubt it will eventually).

(5) In 1948, by helping to launch the Progressive Party, it helped cut off the Left from the bulk of the labor movement (in this mistake, to be fair, it had plenty of company).

(6) By its sectarian policies (e.g., the defeat of the "Vermont Resolution" on foreign policy) it further narrowed the PP's base.

(7) It has shown itself far less capable of understanding the USSR than many non-Communists and, indeed, some non-Marxists.

Errors can, of course, be corrected, and the CP has never hesitated to do so—once history has hit it over the head. But when a man who has fallen over his own feet for the sixth or seventh time remarks brightly "I seem to have tripped!", one may conceivably admire his candor but hardly his footwork. The CP has made a somewhat enforced virtue of the "frankness" with which the world Communist movement is admitting its errors. The skeptic would be more impressed if there were fewer and less serious errors to be frank about—the more so in view of the CP's claims to a scientific outlook. One is tempted to say: if this be science, give me that old-time religion!

The CP's errors, moreover, have not been offset by many unique contributions. Its errors were mostly its own; its virtues, apart from energy and courage, were mostly those of others. For example, Communists have fought hard (along with many other Americans) for Negro rights. The CP's only *special* contribution to this field, however, has been its confused and confusing theory of self-determination for the Black Belt. Most Americans (and of course the CP) were concerned with winning the war and establishing post-war prosperity; it took the Communists to come up with the notion of a permanent no-strike pledge.

The one area in which the CP was most clearly differentiated from the mass of liberals and leftists—its advocacy of socialism—has been neglected for nearly twenty years. There have been plenty

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of inaccurate panegyrics of Soviet socialism—but hardly a word on what socialism could mean to Americans.

The CP Is Legally Compromised

(1) It has been legally adjudged (in effect) a conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the government.

(2) Mere membership in it is now a felony; there is more than a slight possibility that the Supreme Court will go along with this.

(3) The party has been ordered to register under the Subversive Activities Act—which of course it cannot possibly do. The Supreme Court may ultimately go along with this too.

(4) It is also subject to all sorts of legal and quasi-legal harassments—such as the recent raid on the Daily Worker.

It is obvious that the many laws and decisions now in effect against the CP are a threat, actual or potential, to every American with views to the left of McCarthy; for this reason if for no other they should be repealed or reversed. In fact, however, while the operation of these measures can no doubt be limited in scope, their negation *so far as the CP is concerned* seems highly unlikely in the immediate future. Inevitably, therefore, a large part of the CP's efforts will for an indefinite period be devoted merely to staying alive.

The CP Is Morally Compromised

It has lost much over the past ten years—membership, influence, organizational footholds, and legal protections. All these might be reparable had it not also lost the one "priceless ingredient"—moral authority. Twenty years ago many, perhaps a majority of Americans, though they might have considered the CP wrong or even crazy, would have conceded that it meant well. How many could be found today of the same opinion? The reasons are familiar:

(1) Since its birth the CP has served as unofficial press agent for the USSR, ignoring gross violations, not merely of Marxism but of human decency of a sort which no progressive, let alone any socialist, would have tolerated in silence in any capitalist country.

(2) From 1939 to 1941 it placed both the Nazis and their opponents on an almost identical moral footing, thus giving the impression that it opposed Nazism only when the USSR was fighting Nazis.

(3) Because it calls itself Communist, and because it has until very recently never criticized any Communist government, it is naturally associated by Americans with the criminal repres-

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sions and frameups which have now been officially admitted by these governments.

(4) Because of this, and because its own stand on civil rights under socialism has been (until very recently) so unclear, it is almost universally suspected of favoring civil rights only for itself and for its friends.

(5) It has admittedly stifled criticism in its own ranks for years.

Up to the past four months, in fact, the CP has shown no evidence of possessing any independent judgment or conscience. It attacked Beria—but only when the USSR did. It accepted, rejected, and reaccepted Tito—when the USSR did. It denounced Hitler, turned to neutrality and returned to denouncing Hitler—when the USSR did. It has at last admitted what has been clear for years—that Stalin and the CPSU were far from infallible. But, as always, only when the USSR did. By what it has said and by what it has not said for more than twenty years, the CP has proved that it is dominated by the USSR—not financially, not organizationally, but intellectually. And since the latter is obviously true, people are the more ready to believe the former.

For this reason the CP's present precarious legal situation is partly of its own making. Doubtless the American left generally would have been hard hit by the Cold War years—but it is hard to believe that we would have been *so* hard hit had not the CP done so much to turn itself into a sitting duck for the McCarthys.

It is easy and tempting to say that the CP's weaknesses were those of the leadership. In fact, large sections of the membership possessed the same weaknesses. Others, though they were uneasy, went along with repeated mistakes and moral fence-straddling out of "loyalty" to the USSR, the party leadership, or what not. Most of those who thought or learned to think for themselves were either kicked out or "voted with their feet" and walked out. Despite the unprecedented and welcome flood of criticism in the *Daily Worker*, it is not yet certain that a majority of the present CP membership will not, once the present fuss has died down, once more allow the leadership to do its thinking for it—as happened after the Duclos letter eleven years ago.

Faced with the severest challenge of its history, the CP faces three general possibilities:

(1) It can once again accept uncritically the newest Soviet version of history and let it go at that—until the next time. On the face of it, it seems extremely unlikely that the CP will give the Kremlin another blank check—though the British CP, voting "full confidence in the (Soviet) Central Committee" has done just about

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that.

(2) It can make a clean break with the past. This would involve not merely a thorough review of its own history (such as Foster's *History of the CPUSA* certainly was not) but the demotion, regardless of past services, of those bureaucrats who have clearly demonstrated their inability (in Lenin's phrase) to understand history except from the backside. On past performance, this sort of root-and-branch housecleaning seems equally unlikely.

(3) Most likely is some sort of compromise between the above courses of action—one which might correct most of the CP's mistakes while leaving relatively intact the bureaucratic machine which bears the prime responsibility for these mistakes.

But the question still remains: regardless of what the CP does or does not do in the future, in the light of its past will anybody give a damn? Has not the CP perhaps passed its point of no return? As a recent letter in the Daily Worker put it, "There is such a thing as striking out."

It may be objected that during the early '30s the CP operated under handicaps at least as severe, and was still able to increase enormously its membership and influence. In fact, small and sectarian as the CP was then, it was in the fields we have mentioned far stronger than it is today. It had made far fewer mistakes—if only because it was still young. It was not morally compromised—the purges and Stalin's personal dictatorship were still to come. And while it was frequently subject to severe state and local harassment, the Federal government played little or no part in this. None of the present repressive Federal laws and precedents were on the books.

Even more important: during the early '30s the CP had the luck to be operating in a political vacuum. Masses of Americans followed it because there was no other organization which supported their immediate and burning needs. No such situation will recur in the foreseeable future—the many reformist groups now in existence (AFL-CIO, ADA, NAACP) will see to that.

The situation now facing American socialism cannot be compared with that of a generation ago. Nor can it be compared with that facing European socialism today. There the working class is already largely socialist in ideology and under Communist and/or socialist leadership. An American socialist group faces the job of winning over a largely anti-socialist working class dominated by a powerful and entrenched conservative-reformist leadership.

This article is merely a tentative survey of the situation, put forward in the hope of provoking discussion. It does not pretend to be a comprehensive survey of the CP over a 20-year period. More-

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over, it has left untouched at least two important questions bearing on the matter:

(1) Has the influence of the CP *as a party* (as opposed to the influence of individual Communists, whether or not known as such) been significant at any time since 1936?

(2) In a country which is and will remain in the foreseeable future a two-party country (though of course not necessarily with the same parties!), is a political party the most effective present form of socialist organization?

American socialism unquestionably has a future. To realize that future will, as every socialist knows, be a long and difficult job, and one to which no existing socialist group is anywhere near adequate. As we have seen, there are strong reasons for believing that the CP never will be. If these reasons are conclusive, then it is certainly high time to start thinking about a new socialist organization—one which could eventually absorb much of the membership of the various existing socialist groups (including, of course, the CP) along with the thousands of socialists who are at present without organizational ties; one which, above all, could carry on the fight for socialism without bearing around its neck the terrible millstone of legal semi-paralysis and 20 years' dogma and double-think.

INNOCENT PARTIES

BY SAGITTARIUS

We're the legion of the bleaters, and we follow with the rest
When Comrade Khrushchev calls us from the fold;
We close the ranks in London, in Warsaw and Budapest,
For we don't want to be left out in the cold.
The blinding revelation of unconscious deviation
In painful reappraisal must result—
When the Soviet fraternal calls Stalin's rule infernal,
We all together damn the Stalin cult.

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We're poor little lambs who lost our way,
Baa! Baa! Baa!
We're little black sheep he led astray,
Baa-aa-aa!
Bleating our faith fraternally,
Bleating for all eternity,
Marx have mercy on such as we,
Baa! Baa! Baa!

Since learning that the Lenin-Stalin line was incorrect,
We're all spontaneously de-Stalinized.
The cult of personality we piously reject—
All comrades may be frankly criticized.
The tyrant's reign of terror stemmed from dialectic error
Although we never noticed at the time,
But now our ranks are shaken to find we were mistaken,
Unwittingly condoning Stalin's crime.

We emphasize our loathing of exaggerated views,
Repenting of the inadvertent slip;
The guilty individual all comrades may accuse,
But never the collective leadership.
We stress that in perspective a leader is defective,
But there constructive criticism ends,
So you can hear us bleating at every Party meeting,
Our horror of all anti-Party trends.

With frank self-criticism we acknowledge past mistakes,
Which, though unconscious, cause us deep distress;
And now the Supreme Soviet a new direction takes,
Our ideologic error we confess.
Our loyalty is frantic, while never sycophantic,
And every time they change the Party line,
Response is automatic—our turns are acrobatic,
Because of course, we haven't any spine.

We're poor little lambs who lost our way,
Baa! Baa! Baa!
We're little black sheep he led astray,
Baa-aa-aa!
Bleating our faith fraternally,
Bleating for all eternity,
Marx have mercy on such as we,
Baa! Baa! Baa!

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WHAT'S IN A NAME?

BY HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

"What's in a name?"

Juliet's wistful query presupposed a negative answer—Nothing. That supposition may be valid for roses and lovers—it certainly is not valid for many other important objects of human interest. Names may become very powerful and influential. A huge public utility does not call itself "Consolidated Edison" just out of reverence for the memory of a great inventor.

Names may also become dangerous and harmful, especially if they are highly charged with emotional content. This happens characteristically when the name of a human individual becomes intimately attached to—almost synonymous with—an idea, program, policy, or doctrine of which he is the discoverer, founder, or principal promoter. A concrete case is the customary use of the word "Marxism" to designate a profoundly important principle and program for the reorganization of human society.

The heart of the trouble lies in the fact that when a doctrine becomes identified with the name of an individual, the adherents of that doctrine automatically become the followers, disciples, devotees of the great man. Any departure from his teachings is regarded as "deviation," those who engage in it are "deviationists," and the habitual practice of it is "deviationism." This is taken to involve not only heresy and treason, but personal disrespect and disloyalty to the founder. This is abhorrent.

All this has the effect of putting a straight jacket on the ideas of the great man, or especially his formulation of them. It condemns them to rigidity and ossification. It precludes modification, improvement, and growth.

Now, very far from being an honor to the great man, this situation is actually the reverse. It almost never happens that a creation of the mind of a single individual, no matter how profound, is so basic, so eternal, as never to call for modification in the light of changed conditions or new knowledge. If the name of the man is inseparably connected with a rigid formula, he gradually becomes disregarded and eventually fails to get credit for the significant contribution that he made. His followers are regarded as fanatics or old fogies.

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It might seem at first that this would not be true in the realm of science. There is a prevailing notion among laymen—sometimes encouraged, it must be admitted, by the scientists—that science is fixed, final, and immutable. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Science is in a constant state of flux—changing, modifying, adapting. Those of us who have not yet reached the four-score milestone can remember that in our college study of physics and chemistry we were taught that there were about sixty-five elements, an atom was defined as the final, *indivisible* particle of matter, and we had never heard of either metallic or electrical radiation. Yet this was the science of our day, and we were required to accept it. This is not to say that certain great scientific truths do not become established beyond the peradventure of a doubt. No one has any misgivings that some day we will have to unlearn the proposition that the earth is round and revolves around the sun. Men whose names are associated with stellar discoveries like these—Galileo, Newton—retain their place in the enduring galaxy of genius. But those who have committed their fame to more evanescent "truths" soon disappear except from the dusty tomes of biography or the history of science.

Therefore to treat any man's contribution as sacred—final and unassailable—is to do him the greatest possible disservice. The more inseparably his name is attached to his doctrine, the truer this is. Some great men—like Freud—are so fortunate as to live long enough to make notable modifications in their own doctrines. It is absurd to suppose that they, or any other thinker, at the time of their death had reached the final culmination, and would not have made further changes if life had permitted. The greater the man, the more probable this is. For the followers of an innovator to assume that he had said the final word and that there must be no changes is to deprive him of his just rank.

Many illustrations could be adduced of both the positive and negative aspects of this truth. Closely contemporary with Karl Marx were two famous cousins, Charles Darwin and Francis Galton. Each made a profound and lasting contribution to science and to the enrichment of his fellow men. Both were in the general field of genetics. Darwin based his theory on the natural selection of minute chance variations. Galton rested his program—as did Campanella two and a half centuries earlier—on the analogy with artificial plant and animal breeding. Neither at the time had ever heard of chromosomes, to say nothing of genes. How could they be expected to formulate a doctrine which could hold up in detail in the light of modern biological knowledge? The term "Darwinism" had considerable vogue, and is still in use. A school dedicated to the teaching of Darwinism might have a certain academic value, but it would get little support

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from contemporary scientists. No one would ever think of starting a school to teach "Galtonism." Yet Evolution is one of the unassailable foundation stones of modern science, and Eugenics is a positive, though inconspicuous, feature of advanced social thought.

On the other hand, the scientific theory of population has suffered greatly through having become known popularly, and even technically, as "Malthusianism." Its truth has been obscured and its acceptance hindered by the distaste that many people feel for the *use* that the adherents of Malthus, and even the "gloomy parson" himself, made of the theory. And the damage was compounded by the introduction of the term "Neo-Malthusianism" to designate certain extensions and applications of the theory.

At first thought, it may seem that the great religions of the world offer refutations of this argument. Are they not named after men, and are they not both powerful and beneficial? But on closer analysis it appears that the answer to this question is only a qualified affirmative. Buddhism was named after a man, but derives from a name which he gave himself. Mohammedanism obviously comes from a man's name. But there is also Moslemism (Muslimism), and it appears that the most correct name for the religion is Islam, which means "submission." Judaism was named for a people, not a person. And the Son of Mary was named "Jesus," not "Christ." The Greek *"ho christos"* means "the anointed," the Messiah. Christianity embodies the Messianic conception of the relation between God and man. The history of the world might have been very different if the new cult had been dubbed "Jesusism" instead of "Christianity."

But taken at its best this comparison tends to refute rather than support the suggested argument. For by their very nature religions tend to be conservative, not to say reactionary. Their doctrines become embodied in creeds, dogmas, and rituals, the authority and inviolability of which tend to increase with their antiquity. This is the last thing that could be wished for a scientific theory.

Coming now to Marxism, there is no question that Karl Marx was one of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century and that socialism is one of the profoundest concepts of the human mind. But they are not necessarily coterminous. In the light of the enormous changes that have taken place in the "exact sciences" in the past one hundred years, it is absurd to suppose that changes of at least equal magnitude have not occurred in the plastic social sciences. It is inconceivable that if Karl Marx were writing in the year 1956 he would duplicate *Das Kapital*. He was much too great a thinker for that. Then why should his followers insist on doing that?

Carried to its logical extreme, this leads to adding one great name to another and we get Marxism-Leninism, and then such a

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monstrosity as Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. How far can this go? Fortunately, there may come a change in the atmosphere and the process may be reversed by lopping off one or two of the later additions. What a *reductio ad absurdum!**

One final argument that in a way epitomizes all the others is this: The entrenched defenders of the strongholds of capitalism are not afraid of "Marxism." One hears no warnings of "Creeping Marxism." But "Creeping Socialism" is recognized as a serious menace.

All of the foregoing must not be interpreted as debarring any individual who so chooses from calling himself a "Marxist," or as criticizing him for so doing, just as one philosopher may refer to himself as a Platonist or a Hegelian, or a certain Protestant Christian denomination may call themselves Lutherans. But those who are concerned with bringing about a profound and constructive reorganization of human society must not allow themselves to be circumscribed by any one man's name, nor confined within his rigid formulation, but must concentrate on the great, central, encompassing concept of socialism, which is vastly greater than the greatest individual.

* This article was written before the Twentieth Congress.

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THE GREAT ROAD

BY AGNES SMEDLEY

We present below the Prelude to Agnes Smedley's posthumous work, *The Great Road: the Life and Times of Chu Teh,* which will be published in the fall by Monthly Review Press. We hope that this Prelude will stimulate every MR reader to order the book and to call it to the attention of as many others as possible. For special prepublication offers, see back cover. —THE EDITORS

This is the story of the first sixty years of the life of General Chu Teh, commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army of China. Though General Chu authorized me to write it, it is not an official biography. Time, distance, and the world-shaking work of the Chinese revolution of which he is one of the chief leaders have precluded any final check by him of my facts and interpretations.

This book was first conceived in January 1937, when I arrived in the ancient town of Yenan, northwestern China, where the old Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army, and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which guided that army's destiny, had just established headquarters. Throughout the seven years which I had lived in China up to that time, the official Chinese press, echoed by the foreign press both in China and abroad, had described General Chu Teh variously as a "Red bandit chieftain," a "Communist bandit," a murderer, thief, and arsonist. They had, however, never attempted to explain why millions of honorable and hard-working peasants, workers, idealistic students and intellectuals had been willing to fight or die for the cause which he espoused.

A thousand legends had been woven about his name, so that I expected, upon arriving in Yenan, to find a fiercely heroic and fire-eating figure, an iron revolutionary whose eloquent tongue could set forests afire. Consumed with curiosity, I went with two friends to his headquarters on the first evening of my arrival in Yenan, and stepped inside the door to his private room.

The first thing I saw was an unpainted table lit by candlelight and piled with books, documents and papers, and the dim outline of a figure in blue-gray cotton uniform who had arisen as we entered.

First, we stood appraising each other. I knew already that he was fifty-one, but I now saw that his face was heavily lined, his cheeks sunken, and that he looked at least ten years older. He had

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but recently completed the epic Long March of the Red Army and the marks of undernourishment and suffering were on him.

In height he was perhaps five feet eight inches. He was neither ugly nor handsome, and there was nothing whatever heroic or fire-eating about him. His head was round and was covered with a short stubble of black hair touched with gray, his forehead was broad and rather high, his cheekbones prominent. A strong, stubborn jaw and chin supported a wide mouth and a perfect set of white teeth which gleamed when he smiled his welcome. His nose was broad and short and his skin rather dark. He was such a commonplace man in appearance that, had it not been for his uniform, he could have passed for almost any peasant in any village in China.

Men had told me that he was a simple, kindly and very commonplace man, hard-working, and without any interest in making himself a personal hero. All that they said seemed true, yet that term "simple" seemed true only after a fashion. His eyes, gazing at me, were very watchful and appraising. Unlike the eyes of most Chinese, which are black, his were a deep and soft brown, large, and gleaming with intelligence and awareness. I knew that a revolutionary leader of such long and bitter experience as his could not have remained so very simple and yet survive.

One thing I sensed at once: every inch of him was masculine, from his voice and movements to the flat-footed way in which he stood. As my eyes became accustomed to the murkiness of the room I saw that his uniform was worn and faded from long wear and much washing, and I noted that his face was not immobile, but exceedingly expressive of every emotion that passed through him.

Still recalling the many tales circulated about him I told him of the charges of banditry against him, and expected him to laugh as I did. Instead of laughing, he fell suddenly silent, lowered his head and stared at the earthen floor, and his face became drawn and stark as if from tragedy. In that brief moment I caught a glimpse of some deep and tragic emotion seldom seen by his friends and comrades who spoke of him as a perennially optimistic man. The moment passed, he raised his head and looked at me with level eyes and said:

"Banditry is a class question."

I thought of one line in a Western American folk ballad, "Some rob with a gun, some with a fountain pen," but held my peace and was soon asking him something about his life. No, he replied to one question, he was not a rich landlord by origin but, instead, the son of a poor peasant family of Szechwan Province. I was to learn later that few or none of his own comrades knew much about his life and that none of them had had time to sit down and write books about him or anyone else.

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It was while he was speaking that I conceived the idea of writing his biography, and when he asked me what I wished to do in Yenan I replied:

"I would like you to tell me the story of your whole life."

"Why?" he asked, curiously, and I answered:

"Because you are a peasant. Eight out of every ten living Chinese are peasants. Not one has ever told his story to the world. If you would tell me your life story, a peasant would be speaking for the first time."

"My life is only a small part of the life of the Chinese peasants and soldiers," he remarked. "Wait a little, look about and meet others before you decide."

I did as he suggested, and indeed met many men of more dramatic character than General Chu, men whose lives are the stuff from which great literature is made. Chinese peasants, however, are not dramatic, and I clung to my original idea, and in March 1937 we set to work.

As the weeks and months passed, with two or three evenings a week spent writing down what General Chu told me, I sometimes despaired of my task. He came of obscure, illiterate people and there were no letters, books, documents, or diaries to consult. He could not always remember exact dates and, until he was past forty, there was almost no public mention of his existence. He was a very busy man and often seemed to think the details of his childhood unimportant. Chinese family life, his military career, and, finally, his Communist Party discipline and life, had molded him into a collectivist until it was sometimes difficult to know just what he as an individual had thought or done, or just where he left off and the revolution began.

The anti-Japanese war began while we were in the midst of his life story and he went to the front. I therefore put the book aside, but soon left for the front, not only to write a different book but also to observe him in action in so far as this was possible. Therefore, for one year I was able to watch him at work, at play, and at war with Japanese imperialism.

Apart from his multifarious military and political duties, it seemed to me that I had never known any human being with such a tenacious lust for life, nor one so basically democratic. There seemed no aspect of human existence that he did not long to explore and understand. Apart from the evenings of regular work with me in Yenan, he would sometimes drop in to talk with me and with other people who gathered to drink tea in the sunny courtyard of the place where I lived, to eat peanuts, tell tales, sing songs and, as he some-

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times said, "to boast."

During such idle, friendly moments I would often line everyone up and teach them the Virginia reel. Nothing on earth could keep General Chu from taking part in such dances, and he would swing his partner, *do-si-do,* and kick up the dust with a gust as great as that of the youngest guard in the line. When I had taught him all I could of folk dancing, he asked me to teach him Western social dancing, which I did.

He danced as he worked—plugging at it patiently, convinced that it was just another means of breaking down old Chinese feudal customs. He liked it, too, but he was not the sort of which great dancers are made, as was one of his generals, the colorful Ho Lung.

Prowling around to see what General Chu was doing, I sometimes found him lecturing in the Red Army Academy, renamed Kangta—the Anti-Japanese Resistance University—or playing basketball with the cadets in the courtyard of the academy. At the front later, I often sat on the sidelines as a critic and watched him and his staff officers compete in basketball with some of their headquarters guards. General Chu would often shake his head a little wistfully and remark that the young guards never liked him to play on their side because he wasn't a very good player.

He loved the theaters and he loved singing, and only necessary work kept him from theatrical performances in Yenan or at the front. In the last years of the Second World War, when the American Military Observer Group in Yenan gave showings of American movies, he was seen at almost every showing, howling at Abbott and Costello who, incidentally, are in the tradition of Chinese clowns and slapstick artists.

On the first evening that he was to work with me I stood with Lily Chang, a young actress who was my Chinese teacher and secretary-interpreter, and waited for him on the terrace before the loess cave rooms which we occupied. Lily was to interpret when I failed to understand Chinese or when the German which both General Chu and I spoke to some extent, broke down—which was often. As we waited we looked down on the small town of Yenan in the valley below with the Yen River flowing beyond its ancient walls and, beyond the river, the high pagoda on the loess cliff and the broad flat in the valley where the Yen flowed eastward to join the Yellow River, China's Sorrow. The broad flat, now a drill ground soon to become an airfield, had but recently been turned into a race course. That was when a party of hard-riding, tough Mongols came riding down from the north for a conference with the Red Army, an occasion which caused General Chu to issue warning advice to all women and girls to make themselves scarce or to become very formal

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lest the guests misunderstand their welcome.

Yet the women and girls, I among them, turned up on that broad flat to watch the horse races between the Mongols and the Red Army cavalry and we wondered at the Mongol riders who had trained their shaggy mounts in swift trotting while they bent far back in the saddles until they were all but lying down on the backs of their horses. A Red Army rider had borrowed my swift pony, given me by General Chu, for the races, and Lily and I had yelled ourselves hoarse as we watched the little pony, like an Arabian steed, falling behind the tank-like Mongolian pony with his flying mane and long tail. The Mongols had now returned to Inner Mongolia, taking Red Army military and political advisers with them. War with Japan was being prepared and the revolution was lapping over into Inner Mongolia.

On the hour set, for he was a punctual man, we saw General Chu coming through the streets of the little town in the valley below. His guard was behind his undistinguished figure and General Chu was turning his head as if in conversation. He walked bent forward a little from the waist and his legs moved in a pumping gait that had carried him over untold thousands of miles of the paths and roads of China. He came up the loess cliff, coughing the hoarse bronchial cough that he had contracted in the mountains of eternal snow of Sikang Province. He halted once and he and the young guard with the automatic at his hip stood looking up the Yen River valley, pointing as they spoke. There was talk in the town of building a dam up the valley to prevent floods and provide irrigation, and to reforest the naked hills and valleys. Their voices came up to us, his deeper and a little hoarse, mingling with the higher and fresh voice of the tall and handsome youth by his side. It occurred to me that three generations were involved in this vast Chinese revolution: General Chu's, the young guard's, and the young generation below the teen age.

General Chu and the young guard came on up the hill to our terrace. The peasant family that shared the terrace with us, hearing his voice, came out and greeted him with a loud welcome, peasant to peasant; and he went among them, patting the head of a little boy and taking the baby from the arms of the mother to lift it in the air above him and laugh with it.

In such a manner, and in such a setting, this book began.

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Perspective on Russia

Difficulties aplenty confront anyone who tries to follow the course of events in his own homeland; in foreign countries the difficulties are multiplied. Perhaps the best approach for a Westerner who seeks to understand Russia is to begin with a clarification of human attitudes toward social situations.

Bold, venturesome spirits are attracted and challenged by the new, the strange, the unfamiliar. Most human beings, however, avoid danger and dread the unknown. New ventures, new approaches, new attitudes are looked upon with suspicion. In a stable, settled community, innovators usually are unpopular and suspect.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, the institutions they set up were novel and their purposes unfamiliar to most people in the United States and Canada. Decades of home-vintage propaganda have supplemented newness and unfamiliarity by four compelling human drives: suspicion, aversion, fear, and hatred. Before we can hope to understand Russia, we must bring these inhibiting emotions under control.

The process of reworking public opinion and adapting it to the needs of the power-holders (called "brain washing" when it is done in China and "loyalty adjustment" when it happens here in the United States) is not accidental or fortuitous, but the result of extensive planning and elaborate preparations, carried out by carefully selected teams of competent, trained personnel.

Those of us who had a chance to watch the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis remake public opinion were impressed by the ease with which suspicion, aversion, fear, and hatred could be aroused through the determined and persistent use of modern techniques. Men, women, and children, workers, technicians, professionals, small business people, and farmers responded quite generally and came out of the "brain bath" with a new range of attitudes and outlooks and particularly with heightened fears and intensified hates.

When we get far enough from the 1946-1956 decade to see it in perspective, we will undoubtedly agree that similar causes have produced like effects in the United States. In 1945, if the Soviet

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Air Ministry had invited the United States Air Force Chief of Staff to an aviation day in Moscow, the American official would have accepted with alacrity, and would have gone with overwhelming public approval. In the closing days of May, 1956, after harried and frightened deliberations by top officials, President Eisenhower finally gave his consent and announced that Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining, would attend the Air Show in Moscow on June 24th, but the decision was considered and reconsidered for days, and finally made public in the teeth of strong opposition. In the interval between 1945 and 1956, propaganda has converted the Soviet Union from a valued ally into Public Enemy Number One.

Growth and Decay

Developments in the present-day world are examples of two universal processes which are working at cross purposes in every human society—expansion and contraction, growth and decay. Like gravity, these social forces do not recognize the Iron Curtain. Through four decades we have seen socialism grow and expand, while capitalism declined and contracted.

Several factors have speeded up these developments. Invention and discovery (science and technology) have transformed man's relation to space and time, enlarged his control over nature, multiplied his social contacts and relationships and thus created the possibility of a planned, peaceful, planet-wide society. The resulting growth of wealth and income, centered in industrial and commercial cities, has liberated many human beings from the limitations and exactions of life and labor on the land, and enabled them to turn their energies into a wide range of vocations and avocations. The wars of the period have had a three-fold effect—disrupting and destroying the structure and functioning of capitalist imperialism; offering suppressed, exploited, and repressed peoples an opportunity for self-determination; and opening the way for putting socialist theory into practice.

Different groups have reacted variously to these developments. The capitalist-imperialist power-wielders, forty years ago, in 1914-1918, were engaged in the military phases of a power struggle which was intended to redivide the world among rival empires. Only after 1917 did they turn their attention to the problem of preventing other and competing social groups from seizing the power for which the stalemated capitalists were fighting. Advocates of order and peace in a planned society moved to break the military stalemate of 1915-1917 by putting socialism into practice, first in Tsarist Russia, and later elsewhere. Colonial and dependent peoples expressed their nationalism by declaring their independence of the empires and setting out to govern themselves. The large and relatively comfortable

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segment of Western society called the middle class, hesitated, vacillated, and finally threw in its lot with the capitalists.

Step by step the peoples took sides. First, there was the side of the diehards who swore that competitive private enterprise could and would survive in the power age. The United States was kingpin on that side, after helping to smash the pretensions of Italian, Japanese, and German private enterprisers in the wars of 1939-1945. The second side was occupied by the Soviet Union alone from 1918 until the 1940s, when it came to include the Eastern Europeans and the Chinese. On a third side (for society is many-sided) were the Scandinavians, and perhaps the British, who mixed capitalism and collectivism in varying proportions. The fourth side was occupied by newly independent peoples like India and Indonesia who were and still are determined to retain their sovereignty, but are uncommitted as between capitalism and socialism.

Four Decades of Trial and Error

Since 1918, Russia has pioneered in the development of socialism. The development of socialism depended upon the use of science and technology. Russia was backward, particularly in technology. The Revolution of 1917 secured for the Russian people ownership and control of the social instruments of production. The next step was to plan and build a socially organized productive apparatus which would provide an abundance of the necessaries and decencies of life. Building a new social order requires trained personnel which was woefully lacking in the Soviet Union.

Struggling with illiteracy, superstition, inertia, and active counterrevolution at home, faced with boycott, blockade, and invasion from a world of foreign enemies, the Soviet leaders persuaded and prodded their supporters, dragged along the indifferent, liquidated the hostile. From the economic paralysis, political impotence, and social chaos of 1917-1923, the Soviet Union lifted itself by its bootstraps to the position of a major world power thirty years later. Another ten years, and in 1956 it was out to equal and excel the culture pattern which had dominated the planet from 1815 to 1917.

Tremendous alterations in the economic and political patterns of world culture had opened the way for an overall experiment in the application of scientific techniques to the organization and administration of a planet-wide culture. For forty years, the Soviet Union has been in the forefront of the struggle to transform a competitive, acquisitive, segmented culture pattern made up of armed, sovereign, warring nations into a coordinated world of peace and plenty.

Stupendous difficulties faced the promoters of such a project.

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At home and abroad, they were obstructed, hampered, harried, attacked. Ten years after the devastations of World War II had wrecked capitalist imperialism and crippled the builders of socialism, science and technology began to pay off, and 1955 found the Soviet leaders launching a general drive to equal and excel on the economic, political, and cultural fronts.

Russia and the Russians have led in the social pioneering of 1917-1956, evolving new concepts, planning, experimenting, adventuring. Like all innovators they have made mistakes, and like all discoverers of new values they have attracted attention, aroused interest, stirred up opposition, and eventually secured a following.

Soviet Scientists Speak Up

Washington's "classified" atomic information has aroused merriment and not a little scorn in London and Paris. Documents inaccessible to students and researchers in the United States have been on sale for a few cents in European book stores. Washington newsmen are constantly protesting against the unwillingness of government departments to supply needed information on matters of urgent public concern.

Recent speeches and publications of Soviet scientists provide a welcome contrast to Washington's policy of secrecy. Soviet participants in last year's Geneva conference on atomic energy were very outspoken. Academician I. V. Kurchatov, who accompanied Bulganin and Khrushchev on their visit to Britain, addressed a gathering of top British scientists at Harwell on "Some Aspects of Atomic Power Development in the USSR." *The New Statesman and Nation* for May 5, 1956 reported on "Mr. Kurchatov at Harwell": "The Russians are on the threshold of controlling H-energy for peaceful uses and have discarded secrecy to tell the scientists of the world about the experiments which they have carried out and the principles which they are following. Nor have they made a condition that there should be reciprocal disclosure though four-fifths of what he told his British colleagues would have been classified as top-secret by British security."

Twelve United States physicists returned late in May, 1956, from a Moscow conference attended by about a thousand of the leading Soviet physicists. Harrison E. Salisbury summed up their observations in *The New York Times,* of June 3: The American visitors, wrote Mr. Salisbury, were asked what they wanted to see and were permitted to visit any physics experimental facilities and laboratories they desired. Said one United States physicist: "They answered every question. We were permitted to bring our cameras right into their experimental laboratories and take pictures of every-

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thing we wanted."

Unilateral disclosures of scientific information which is still "hush! hush!" in London and Washington, like sharp unilateral reductions in the Soviet armed forces, gave Moscow an initiative which her Anglo-American competitors must hustle to equal.

The Soviets Score Again

Walter Lippmann wrote of "Another Soviet Initiative" in his "Today and Tomorrow" column of May 17, 1956. Secretary Dulles, Mr. Lippmann believes, has misjudged both the causes and effects of the Soviet decision to demobilize more than a million men. European reactions to the Soviet announcement will differ from the views expressed by the Secretary of State, said Mr. Lippmann, first because Western Europe is short of manpower and could use military conscripts in industry; and second, West Europeans will ask: "If the Soviet Union can demobilize something like a quarter of its men under arms and still be just as powerful as ever, how many men could be demobilized—or, in the case of the Germans, not conscripted —without making Western Europe less secure?"

Lippmann concludes: "The question is not really whether the Soviets are beguiling and deceiving us, but whether they are going to persuade Western Europe that they know how to show the way to security and prosperity. Certainly in this matter of reducing military personnel, the door on which they are pushing is already ajar."

More East-West Trade

More East-West trade was assured by the decontrol, on April 26, of some 700 items, including beverages, rubber products, drugs, dental equipment, optical goods, office equipment, and bicycles. "Decontrol" means that these 700 items can now be shipped to Iron Curtain countries without export licenses issued in Washington.

Economic blockade is one of the devices on which Washington has been relying to strangle Communism. The gimmick has failed. After years of economic constriction, Communism is more widespread than before the blockade began, and is more popular than ever with the strategically located peoples of Southeast Asia, as shown by recent election returns in Ceylon and Burma.

Britain has extended the decontrolled list by announcing that British businessmen may now ship to Iron Curtain countries a large number of other items which are still barred by Washington.

Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks accompanied his announcement of the decontrol measure by asserting that the United States would continue to bar the shipment of strategic goods to Com-

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munist nations and maintain its total embargo on all shipments to China and North Korea.

Deserted by its Western European allies, driven to a modification of its restrictions on East-West trade, Washington continues its barren and self-destroying program of economic strangulation.

Asian Attitudes

James G. Endicott, of Toronto, Canada, who attended the meeting of the World Council of Peace in Stockholm, April 5-9, 1956, reports his impressions in the *Canadian Far Eastern Newsletter* for April, 1956 (134 Glenholme Ave., Toronto 10, Ontario, Canada: $1.25 per year). The meeting was attended by 150 Council members and 250 observers. There were delegations of about 20 persons each from China, India, and Japan. The United States was virtually unrepresented, due to State Department pressure. Mr. Endicott writes:

> Both the Indian and the Japanese delegations represented all political parties and a cross-section of public life. Asia is in a ferment of change and has many types of economic and social organization, but at the same time is feeling a strong sense of "Asian solidarity." They are determined to support peaceful coexistence, to keep a "zone of peace" in Asia and to proceed rapidly with far-reaching economic changes. The American "China Lobby" (Dulles, Nixon, Radford and Knowland) is trying to prevent these changes with military intervention by way of Rhee, Chiang and Ngo Ding-diem in Vietnam. Such a policy is bound to end in humiliating defeat. Asia's attitude to American policy in general, wherever the Far East is concerned, and in particular where the East China coast is concerned, is now one of deep contempt. They will say that it is known the American people are generous, democratic and probably want peace, but in the Far East they appear as dangerous, homicidal lunatics, brandishing atom bombs instead of correcting their mistakes. Even their friends can no longer defend them.

Two propositions emerged in the Political Commission which drafted a statement on the tasks of the world peace movement. "(1) *Cooperation*: The time has come when all those forces and organizations which have already expressed themselves as in favor of peaceful solutions, disarmament and banning of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, can bring about the desired result if they will work together. (2) *Alternative to Disaster*: Our second task was to impress on the world the disastrous consequences of a continued arms race. The armament program was described to us by a British scientist as 'the most expensive operation in the world today for the preservation of poverty.' "

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(*continued from inside front cover*)

tour of colleges and universities which we commented on in last month's "Notes from the Editors." When Sweezy got back East in May, he was invited to speak at the University of New Hampshire by a newly formed student Committee for Academic Freedom. The official student government body refused accreditation to this Committee on the ground that it was not intended to be a continuing organization, whereupon an honors society named the Senior Skulls stepped into the picture and took over the invitation, balancing it, in order to meet political criticism, with an invitation to an extreme advocate of free enterprise to lecture two days later. Sweezy's lecture —on the subject of "Marxian Socialism"—was held on the evening of May 21st in the largest auditorium on the UNH campus which seats between 300 and 400. Meanwhile, the newspapers of the state gave the affair more free publicity than any lecture at the University has ever received, with the result that the hall was completely full twenty minutes before starting time. Many who were turned away listened to the University radio station's broadcast of the lecture. The lecture by the free-enterpriser (a gentleman named Leonard Read) two days later was delivered to a half-empty hall. Attacks on the trustees of the University for allowing a lecture by a dangerous subversive who is out on bail after being found in contempt of a New Hampshire court have continued ever since the meeting. To their credit, both the trustees and the University administration have refused to give ground. The whole episode represents a clear-cut and altogether welcome victory for academic freedom in New Hampshire.

Number 11 in the Monthly Review Pamphlet Series is just off the press, and we think it will prove to be one of the most timely and useful pamphlets we have ever published. It is entitled *On Segregation* and combines "The Crisis in Race Relations" from the April issue and "Two Nations—White and Black" from the June issue. This material should receive the widest possible distribution against segregation and because it can serve to introduce socialist views and MR to thousands upon thousands of Negroes and whites who are aroused over the race crisis as they have not been over any other issue in years. Please remember that you, our readers, are our only distribution apparatus and act accordingly. Single copies of the pamphlet are 25 cents, five for $1, and 30 for $5. Every MR reader should have at least five for distribution to friends and acquaintances, and many of you, we feel sure, can easily dispose of a bundle of 30.

We are glad to join in the financial appeal now being made by the Families of Smith Act Victims, an organization which brings much-needed aid and comfort to America's most celebrated group of political prisoners. Whatever funds are collected are used to cover visits to the prisoners by their families, to supply commissary needs, and to pay for books and for magazine and newspaper subs. Show your solidarity with the victims of our home-grown brand of repression by giving generously: Families of the Smith Act Victims, 575 Avenue of the Americas, New York 11, N. Y.

Was Justice Done? by Professor Malcolm Sharp is now off the press, and *The Great Road: the Life and Times of Chu Teh* will certainly be ready for fall distribution. Please order your copies now: we need the money to pay the bills that are now falling due. Details of prices and special offers on the back cover.

We remind you again that this is a double issue of MR and that the next issue will be in September. We plan to have as the feature of that issue a review of the economic situation by the editors. Meanwhile, we wish all of you a happy vacation.

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